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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPETITION
POLICY
Spencer Weber Waller*

INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance law addresses the misaligned incentives between officers and directors of publicly owned companies and their shareholders and how this can lead to the destruction of shareholder value. Antitrust law governs the interaction between corporations and other economic
actors in the marketplace, and prohibits and penalizes anticompetitive
agreements, unilateral conduct which unreasonably injures competition, and
mergers and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition. This
Article explores the puzzling lack of meaningful interaction between these
two fields of law, which govern the internal and external operations of key
economic players in the economy. While a handful of commentators have
lamented the lack of a closer organic connection between these two bodies
of law, most do not even notice.' This Article goes beyond the conventional
disconnect and discusses how to create a more unified approach to two key
areas of business law in order to promote the interests of both shareholders
and consumers in a more systematic and meaningful way.
This Article concludes by proposing several ways to improve both antitrust and corporate compliance law. Certain of the proposed changes fall
on the corporate governance side, including greater duties and liabilities for
officers and directors to prevent harmful and illegal conduct that injures
shareholders. Other changes fall on the antitrust side of the fence and include a greater skepticism for claims of synergies and efficiencies in certain
categories of mergers that have proven time and time again to do nothing to
enhance shareholder value except when competition is harmed. The most
* Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law. This article is an expansion of remarks originally presented at workshops at the University of Utah Law School and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris,
France, DAF/COMP/M(2010)1/ANN3. Thanks to Frank Ballantine, Theodore Banks, Sam Brunson,
James Fanto, Jill Fisch, Andrew Gold, Jesse Markham, Charles Murdock, Arthur Pinto, Steven Ramirez,
Edward Rock, Mark Roe, Larry Schor, D. Daniel Sokol, and Maurice Stucke for their comments and
advice and Joseph Van Leer for his excellent research assistance.
I But see Nathan Newman, The Conflict of the Courts: RICO, Labor, and Legal Preemption in
Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 307, 320 (2003) (stating that antitrust law is a
"companion piece of federal corporate governance law"); D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and
Comparative Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713, 1718-19
(2009) (suggesting that there is an indirect link between corporate governance and antitrust).
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important proposed change though requires a greater willingness to increase
communication and coordination between practitioners and policymakers
so that corporate actors can pursue legitimate strategies to build value for
shareholders and to prevent unlawful anticompetitive behavior, while
avoiding more dubious strategies that currently fall between the cracks in
the bodies of law.
I.

THE BIRTH OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The Modern Corporationand Private Property is the most influential
book in the field of corporate governance. 2 It analyzes how managers and
directors of large corporations often act in their own best interests rather
than the best interests of the shareholders, who are the real owners of the
company.' Professor Adolph Berle, a corporate law expert on the Columbia
Law School faculty, who also worked for President Roosevelt on the New
Deal in numerous capacities, authored this important book in 1932.4 His coauthor, Doctor Gardiner Means, an economist at Harvard University, did
much of the empirical work for the project.'
The book analyzed how corporations had evolved from the nineteenth
century where they were primarily small operations owned and operated by
an identifiable number of individuals, often family members.6 By the early
1930s, corporations were vastly larger and more powerful enterprises with
enormous numbers of shareholders who bought and sold their shares on
stock exchanges.' It was typical that no one shareholder owned more than a
tiny fraction of the shares of the company.!
Berle and Means introduced the concept of the separation of ownership and management to describe the modem corporation, where the real
power lay in the hands of managers and boards of directors who typically
owned only small amounts of stock in the company.' This change meant
2

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY (1933).

See id. at 121-22.
Encyclopedia of World Biography on Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr., BOOKRAGS,
http://www.bookrags.com/biography/adolf-augustus-berle-jr/ (last visited July 8, 2011) (providing a
succinct biography of Berle's public service).
5 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at v-vi.
6 See id at v-viii, 66.
7 Seeid at v-viii, 47.
8 Id. at 47-48. In the United States, modem publicly held corporations are owned by a large group
of shareholders and controlled by nonowner managers and directors. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 3 (2008).
9 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 68. Berle previously introduced similar themes in an
3

4

earlier article. See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1049-50 (1931).
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that ownership changed from active to passive.o But it also meant that the
form of wealth that ownership conferred was more liquid."
The small number of insiders (managers and directors) had greater
knowledge and different incentives than the large number of outsiders (the
shareholders) and could operate the company for their own benefit, potentially harming the shareholders and the corporation in general. 2 The actual
power within the corporation lay with those who appointed the directors,
typically senior management themselves."
The effective result was a self-perpetuating management, which often
pursued its own interests rather than those of the true owners of the corporation.14 Although Berle and Means did not use this term, later writers referred to this as the agency-cost problem." Thus, the field of corporate governance was born to consider appropriate ways to cure or limit the agency
cost problem in the modern public corporation.
Berle and Means termed this a problem of economic governance." The
book argued for more voting rights for shareholders, more disclosures by
management, and other controls for the benefit of the shareholders." The
authors also proposed a broader social role for the corporation as a key institution in the modern economy and society.I
The influence of Berle and Means cannot be understated. The book is
probably the most cited treatise in corporate law and is credited for inspiring much of modern corporate law, securities regulation, the shareholder
democracy movement, the market for corporate control, incentive-based
10

BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 66.

1 Id at67.
12 See id at 69, 121-22.
13 Id at 69-70. Other aspects of the separation of ownership and control came through legal devices like pyramiding, the issuance of nonvoting shares, excessively weighted voting shares, voting trusts,
and more real-world concerns where even a minority interest in a large corporation could yield effective
control. Id.at 70-80.
14 Id at 87-88, 121-22.
15 See MACEY, supra note 8, at 2; Murray Weidenbaum & Mark Jensen, Introduction to the
Transaction Edition of ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION &

PRIVATE PROPERTY, at ix (10th prtg. 2009); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,327 (1976).
16 BERLE & MEANS, supranote 2, at 125.
17 See id. at 247-48, 317.
18

Id. at 355-56; see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 117-18 (1959);

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 104-05 (1954) (continuing the

theme of societal accountability of public corporations); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Tracking Berle's Footsteps: The Trail of The Modem Corporation's Last Chapter,33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 849, 849-55 (2010) (noting that The Modern Corporationsuggests that those in control of corporations serve both the shareholders and the public). See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, ShareholderPrimacy's CorporatistOrigins:Adolph Berle and The Modem Corporation, 34 J.
CORP. L. 99 (2008) (emphasizing Berle's evolving goals within The Modern Corporationand over time
beyond shareholder primacy).
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pay schemes for executives, and most other legal proposals that address the
conflicting incentives between corporate insiders and shareholders."
For example, there is a direct relationship between the concerns of
Berle and Means and the two long standing fiduciary duties imposed on
corporate directors: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.20 "Good faith"
is a subset of both duties, as all directors must act in good faith in performing their duties. 2'
The duty of loyalty requires that directors consider the interest of the
corporation over any personal interests so that they do not profit improperly
at the corporation's expense and avoid self-dealing.22 This duty essentially
aims to prevent conflicts of interest, like self-dealing, between directors and
the corporation (which injures shareholders) and other conduct that exacerbates the agency-cost problem.
The duty of care generally requires directors to act in good faith and
with the degree of diligence, care, and skill that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.23 In Delaware and many
other states, directors are presumed to make informed, rational decisions in
an honest and well-meaning way to further their business.24 This assumption insulates directors from judicial review of many of their decisions and
shields them from personal liability. The presumption rests on the understanding that directors act on a disinterested, informed, and good-faith basis.

Critical to understanding these duties is the business judgment rule.
The business judgment rule is a "presumption that the [b]oard acted independently, with due care, in good faith and in the honest belief that its ac-

19 See Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the CorporateStructure, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 787, 787 (2010); Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation,34 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (2011); Rafael La Porta et al., CorporateOwnership Around the World, 54 J. FIN.
471,471 (1999).
20 See I DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 1 (5th ed. 1998). See generally
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960 (Del. Ch. 1996); JAMES A. FANTO,
DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY

§§

2:2.3(A), 4:2 (2d ed. 2010); Mark David Wallace, Comment,

Life in the Boardroom After FIRREA: A Revisionist Approach to Corporate Governance in Insured
Depository Institutions, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1187, 1195 (1992). There remains a dispute in the literature regarding whether the duty of good faith is a subset of loyalty rather than care, or whether it is an
overarching duty covering both concepts, but it is beyond the scope of this article to resolve this conceptual conundrum.
21 See Caremark,698 A.2d at 967-68; FANTO, supra note 20, §4:2.5.
22 McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 824 (6th Cir. 2001).
23 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (en banc) (citing Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000) (en banc)), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 & n.54
(Del. 2009) (en banc), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010); 1 BLOCK ET
AL., supra note 20, at 1.
24 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
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tions were in the stockholders' best interests." 25 Under the business judgment rule, courts will not second guess a board decision or substitute their
own views if the decision of the board "can be 'attributed to any rational
business purpose. "'26 The presumption is strongest when the board's decision was approved by a majority of independent, disinterested directors.27
Thus, a plaintiff has a heavy burden both to plead and to prove that a board
breached its fiduciary duty of good faith or due care .28 Only when this standard is met will a court review the merits of the plaintiffs allegation to determine whether the conduct in question was "fair to the corporation and its
shareholders."29 Even then, in the absence of faulty process, uninformed
25 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996); see also I BLOCK ET AL., supra note 20, at
4-5; Harvey J. Goldschmid, Outline on the Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule, in ALl'S
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 37, 44 (1994) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. Even this is a
default rule. In Delaware and certain other jurisdictions, corporations may adopt charter provisions and
bylaws absolving directors of breaches of their duty of care but may not protect intentional or criminal
conduct. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010). See generally MACEY, supranote 8, at 19.
26 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (quoting Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
27 See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988), overruledon other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (en banc).
28 See In re Dwight's Piano Co., 424 B.R. 260, 285 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009). The application of
the business judgment rule by courts is further complicated by the procedural rules that apply to shareholder derivative suits. A derivative lawsuit is a claim brought by shareholders on behalf of the corporation to redress harm done by the publicly traded company, its officers, or directors. Because such causes
of action are deemed to belong to the corporation, the plaintiff normally must make a demand on the
corporation (and its board of directors) for permission to sue on behalf of the corporation. The board of
directors may accept or reject such demands and the recommendation of the board will be judged under
the business judgment rule. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 783-84 (Del. 1981). Not
surprisingly most boards reject demands to initiate derivative actions. Bradley T. Ferrell, Note, A Hybrid
Approach: Integrating the Delaware and the ALI Approaches to ShareholderDerivative Litigation, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 253 (1999). However, demand may be excused when it is futile. Zapata, 430 A.2d at
784 (quoting McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191, 193 (Del. Ch. 1931)). This can include situations where the
director's duty of loyalty is subject to challenge or where the board has acted outside the confines of the
business judgment rule. Even in this situation, the board of directors can convene a special litigation
committee to investigate the merits of the plaintiffs claim, report to the board, and recommend whether
the case should be dismissed or continued. See id. at 785, 788. Most special litigation committees recommend the dismissal of the lawsuit they have investigated. Cf Minor Myers, The Decisions of the
CorporateSpecial Litigation Committees: An EmpiricalInvestigation,84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1310-12, 1314
(2009) (providing a more positive view of special litigation committees while also noting that most
commentators believe that special litigation committees always dismiss derivative lawsuits). The special
litigation committee's recommendations are tested by the court first to determine whether the special
litigation committee utilized a fair process in its determination. Only then would the court proceed to the
"merits" of the case challenging the alleged violation of the board's duties and the harm to shareholders.
See generally 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 20, at 1379-1818 (explaining the business judgment rule as it
pertains to shareholder derivative lawsuits); FANTO, supra note 20, § 5:7 (discussing director decisions
on shareholder derivative litigation); MACEY, supra note 8, at 133-36 (explaining derivative suits).
29 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). Cf Jessica Erickson,
CorporateGovernance in the Courtroom:An EmpiricalAnalysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1752-
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decisionmaking, or a conflict of interest, the courts have been extremely
reluctant to impose liability on corporations or their directors, no matter
how disastrous the consequences of the board's decision.30
The business judgment rule applies to allegedly poor action, rather
than unconscious inaction or an outright failure in board oversight.' The
board will be legally responsible for its failure to act when it has failed to
consider a particular decision or to exercise its judgment at all.32 Taken as a
whole, the directors (and particularly the outside directors) act as agents for
the shareholders, but they enjoy substantial protection from legal liability
for their decisions (or lack thereof) when their actions (or inactions) were
the result of a proper process, good faith, informed decisionmaking, and
without an outright conflict of interest." This modem template has arisen
out of the concerns first raised by Berle and Means, even if the modern
expression of these concerns is different from what the founders of corporate governance themselves advocated for the modern corporation.34
II.

ANTITRUST AND THE MARKET

In contrast to corporate governance law, which concerns itself with the
internal organization of the public corporation, antitrust law is the law of
competition between firms in the marketplace (no matter what their internal
structure). The Sherman Act and later statutes prohibit three main forms of
anticompetitive behavior without regard to whether the market actors are
publicly traded corporations, privately owned corporations, partnerships
and related entities, sole proprietorships, or actual individuals.35
54 (2010) (providing a study of federal court shareholder derivative actions showing few damage
awards, but frequent changes in governance practices).
30 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960-61 (Del. Ch. 1996).
31 See David W. Deal, Directors' Vulnerability to Breach of FiduciaryDuty Claims for Compensation Decisions: Where Have We Been, Where Are We Now?, 30 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 311, 323
(2005); Anne Tucker Nees, Who's the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the Corporate
Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 202 (2010) (noting that there needs to be a clear violation of law
for directors to be held liable for failed oversight).
32 See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441,463 (2007). In addition to
the balance of fiduciary duties and the protections of the business judgment rule imposed by Delaware
and the corporate law of other states, Congress has entered the picture in recent years with the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
which require heightened pleadings standards for securities fraud allegations, automatic removal to
federal court, and preemption of more generous state court rules. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
33 See FANTO, supra note 20, § 2:2.3(A)(3)(c).
34 See Wallace,supra note 20, at 1195.
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 18 (2006).
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in "restraint of trade."36 As early as 1911, the Supreme Court
held that only those agreements that "unreasonably" restrict competition are
unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.37 Certain agreements are so
inevitably destructive of competition that they are per se unreasonable and,
hence, unlawful." Examples of such per se unreasonable agreements between competitors include price fixing, market division, and output restrictions, which are normally prosecuted as criminal offenses by the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ")." All other agreements
require a more detailed and complete examination under a full rule of reason analysis to determine whether, on balance, they unreasonably restrict
competition.4 The only legal concern is the net effect on competition, not
whether the agreement promotes some other socially useful values. 4 1
Anticompetitive behavior by single firms is covered by Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize.42 In order to unlawfully monopolize, a firm must have monopoly power
and engage in unlawful or exclusionary conduct either to acquire or to
maintain that monopoly.43 In order to unlawfully attempt to monopolize, a
firm must (1) have specific intent; (2) engage in unlawful or exclusionary
conduct; and (3) have at least "a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.""
The difficult issue for Section 2 analysis is identifying the difference
between unlawful and exclusionary conduct on the one hand and hard com36 Id.§1.
3
38

Standard Oil Co. ofN.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).

39 See id. at 218 (holding that price fixing is per se illegal); Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant
Att'y. Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement
Over the Last Two Decades 1 (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf (describing how the DOJ's Antitrust Division imposes sanctions on
criminal cartels).
4 See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2006) (ruling that a price-fixing agreement
between two firms in a joint venture was not a per se violation of the Sherman Act because they were
considered one entity and, therefore, not competitors in the relevant market); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (holding that a horizontal price-fixing and outputlimiting arrangement was subject to the rule of reason because without it the product would not exist at
all); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979) (holding that a blanket license agreement should
be subject to the rule of reason).
41 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1990);
Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). See generally Spencer Weber
Waller, Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 62 SMU L. REV. 693 (2009) (arguing that Justice Stevens played a key role in defining a unitary rule ofreason).
42 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Section 2 also prevents conspiracies to monopolize and is applied in a
manner very similar to Section I of the Sherman Act. See id.
43 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
4 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
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petition, or competition on the merits, on the other hand.4" While the courts
have struggled with this issue, there appears to be an evolving consensus
that the proper approach is something akin to the rule of reason test used in
Section 1 analysis."6 In a number of recent Section 2 cases, the courts have
sought to determine whether there is a significant adverse effect on competition and whether that effect is outweighed by efficiency considerations,
business justifications, or other procompetitive justifications for the conduct
at issue.47
Finally, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions of all types if they tend to significantly lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly.48 Here, the focus is on prediction, incipiency, and blocking acquisitions, regardless of form, if they would create a significant risk
of harm to competition in the future. Government guidelines focus on the
risks that the transactions will facilitate either outright collusion among the
remaining players in the markets or anticompetitive oligopolistic (but nominally independent) price coordination.49 In addition, the guidelines are
equally concerned if a transaction would allow the merged entity to unilaterally raise prices or restrict output.o Most significant acquisitions are announced to the federal antitrust agencies in advance, although the transactions can also be challenged after closing." Joint ventures, strategic alliances, and other types of partial mergers can be analyzed under Section 7,
although they may also be reviewed under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.52
The antitrust laws are rarely concerned with the internal structure of
the firms whose conduct is under review. For example, the form of a merger and acquisition is only relevant to the extent that it provides evidence of
the likely competitive effect of the transaction." However, a handful of
situations exist where the analysis of the form or structure of a corporate
actor is necessary for antitrust purposes." As discussed below, Section 8 of
the Clayton Act prohibits interlocking directorates under certain circums-

45 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
46 See Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule ofReason, and the
Unifying PrincipleUnderlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435,435-37 (2006).
47 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59.
48 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
49

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES

§1

(2010) [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
50 See id § 6.
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a).
52 See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.,
378 U.S. 158, 160-61 (1964).
5 See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 2 ("The Agencies consider any
reasonably available and reliable evidence to address the central question of whether a merger may
substantially lessen competition.").
.
Cf id.
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tances, where it is necessary to understand both the competitive relationship
of the firms in question and the structure of their boards of directors to determine whether this provision has been violated."
In addition, a corporation's structure and organization are sometimes
relevant to understanding whether the antitrust laws even apply. For example, Section I of the Sherman Act requires the presence of a "contract,
combination ... or conspiracy" before competitive effects come into question. 6 Some sort of an agreement is required for Section 1 to come into
play, with Section 2 of the Sherman Act being the only antitrust provision
applying to truly unilateral conduct." The Supreme Court has determined
that an agreement for Section 1 purposes means an agreement between two
or more economically independent actors." Thus, the Supreme Court has
held that a corporation cannot conspire with its own employees, directors,
officers, unincorporated divisions, and wholly owned subsidiaries." The
lower courts have extended this analysis and held in most circumstances
that a corporation also cannot conspire with majority-owned subsidiaries,
and sister subsidiaries owned by the same parent cannot conspire where the
parent corporation has effective working control.'
III. SHIPS PASSING IN THE NIGHT

At the broadest level, corporate governance has focused on behavior
and structure within a single firm, and antitrust has focused on behavior and
structure between firms in the market. One is almost subatomic in nature,
and the other focuses on the interaction between business atoms and molecules. Unlike scientific inquiry, however, the two fields have proceeded
without any deep interaction and with little effort to even understand each
other's domain.6 '

55

15 U.S.C. § 19; see also infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text.

56

15 U.S.C.

§

1. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY

UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (2010) (establishing the current state of antitrust law as it pertains to

proving an agreement).
57 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
58 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984).
59 Id. at 769-7 1.
60 See 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 27-29 (6th ed.
2007) (noting that lower courts have applied the Copperweld analysis to various other fact patterns). But
see Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010) (rejecting the claim that the NFL should be
treated as a single economic entity in an antitrust suit challenging exclusive licensing of team merchandise).
61 But see Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 497,
498 (1992) (representing one of the few scholarly pieces that connects the two fields, and focuses on the
boundaries between firms and markets in the analysis).
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There are both historical and professional reasons that these spheres of
expertise and legal practice have remained separate. Corporate law was
created first and, until the Great Depression, was almost entirely a creature
of state law.62 in contrast, antitrust began at the state level, but it rapidly
became almost exclusively federal as state antitrust law was proven ineffective in controlling national corporations.' There was a partial early convergence when strict anti-cartel rules, but loose merger rules, in the late nineteenth century were partially responsible for the initial wave of mergers that
created and strengthened the large national corporations of the Gilded
Age.' But then paths diverged.
In 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed, "no specialized antitrust
discipline or a specialized antitrust branch of the practicing bar or legal
academy" even existed." Antitrust law as a discipline did not materialize
until the 1920s and early 1930s.' By then, additional antitrust statutes had
supplemented the Sherman Act, and dozens of antitrust cases had been decided by the courts." The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") was created
in 1914," and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ was formed in 1933.6' Before the 1920s, American law schools did not even offer antitrust as a separate subject." To the extent antitrust was taught, it constituted only a small
portion of courses like Contracts, Corporations, or Business Planning.'
Law firms also were slow to recognize antitrust as an independent discipline.72 Before the 1950s, very few, if any, law firms had a separate antitrust practice, and the American Bar Association did not create its Antitrust

62

See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937 (1991).

63 See generally James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989) (noting that Progressive
Era, state developments have been largely neglected by scholars despite the insight such developments
provide into early antitrust analysis); James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative
Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
495 (1987) (exploring state statutory and common law from 1880-1918); James May, The Role of the
States in the First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust History, 59
ANTITRUST L.J. 93 (1990).
64 See TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA,
1880-1990, at 2-3, 11-12 (1992); Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The
United States and Germany at the Turn of the 20th Century, 51 AM. J. COMPETITION L. 473, 473-77
(2003).
65 Spencer Weber Waller, The Language ofLaw and the Language ofBusiness, 52 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 283, 285 (2001).
SId.
67 Id. at 285-86.
68 Id. at 286.
69 Id
70 Id.
71 Waller, supra note 65, at 286.
72 Id
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Section until 1952.11 In contrast, corporate law was a well-established specialty within the bar more than a half-century earlier.74 While corporate
governance law was more a creature of the 1930s, it was quickly absorbed
into this existing professional structure of the corporate bar and remained
separate from the professional structure and discourse of antitrust.
As a result of the impact of the Berle and Means treatise and other developments in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great
Depression, corporate governance law became part of the New Deal agenda
and began to make its way into the legal structure of both state and federal
law in the 1930s and beyond." At the federal level, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") was created to regulate the offerings of securities to the public and then later the operation of securities brokers and
dealers." The majority of corporate governance law, however, remained the
province of state law, particularly in Delaware. Corporate governance law
relied on more explicit duties of loyalty and care to better align the interests
of board members, corporate officers, and shareholders."

1

Id. at 286-87.

74

See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN

AMERICA 23-24 (1976); S. Samuel Arsht, A History ofDelaware CorporationLaw, I DEL. J. CORP. L.
1, 7-8 (1976) (describing the enactment of Delaware's 1899 General Corporation Law); William H.
Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron Identity Crisis of the Business Lawyer, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 947,
947 (2005) (highlighting the radical revision of the corporate law at the turn of the twentieth century and
juxtaposing that with the current revision of corporate law starting with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002).
75

See Max Ascoli, Introduction to ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1918-1971:

FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLPH A. BERLE xv, xix-xx (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds.,
1973) (describing how the publicity that Berle gained after the publication of The Modern Corporation
and Private Propertyparlayed into Berle becoming an influential member of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's Brains Trust after the 1932 election and, from this position, influencing economic policy
during the New Deal era).
76

See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 2003).

See, e.g., Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (holding that courts should
be reluctant to federalize substantial portions of corporate law, "particularly where established state
policies of corporate regulation would be overridden," as "[c]orporations are creatures of state law," and
investors expect, with a few clear exceptions, that "state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation" (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating an SEC rule relating to voting
rights by class of securities as beyond the powers conferred by federal law); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) (en banc) (demonstrating the creation of specific duties in Delaware between
corporate boards, directors, and shareholders through a discussion of the business judgment rule), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983) (describing the heightened duties that directors of Delaware corporations
owe to stockholders when they are on both sides of a transaction); see also MACEY, supra note 8, at 5153, 131-32 (providing examples of corporate directors' numerous duties to shareholders and demonstrating how derivative suits operate as a mechanism for shareholders to ensure that director duties are not
violated).
77
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Antitrust was not a significant part of the Berle and Means analysis
and prescription or the resulting corporate governance legal regime. This is
not particularly surprising. Although Berle was knowledgeable about and
interested in antitrust issues," antitrust was at its absolute nadir at the time
he was writing his masterpiece on corporate governance." While The Modern Corporation and Private Property was published in 1933 during the
depths of the Great Depression, the New Deal was following a collectivist
path, and antitrust had been preempted almost entirely, and in part actually
co-opted, in the service of the de facto cartelization of the U.S. economy
under the National Recovery Act ("NRA").so What little antitrust enforcement that existed was undercut by lax Supreme Court interpretation of the
core anti-cartel provisions of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also in seeming
deference to the special needs and circumstances of the Great Depression."
Antitrust law was thus effectively moribund until the NRA was held unconstitutional in 1935.82
It was only then that President Roosevelt (out of principle, pragmatism, or perhaps desperation) chose to revive antitrust law and free-market
competition as tools to solve the lingering Depression.83 Robert Jackson, as
head of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, began the cautious revival of

78 See, e.g., BERLE,supra note 75, at 100-01, 158 (discussing different aspects of New Deal antitrust policy); BERLE, supra note 18, at 43-52 (drawing links between antitrust and securities policies that

promoted the rise of the institutional investor).
79

See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR

34-35 (Vintage Books 1996) (1995) (quoting Rexford G. Tugwell, a member of President Roosevelt's
Brains Trust, as saying that he and other members of the Brains Trust thought that competition was
"wasteful and costly" and sought to limit competition instead of promoting it).
See id at 37-39 (discussing how the National Recovery Act created "code authorities" which
were similar to trade associations and cartels, which allowed major industries and "manufacturers to
agree on common pricing and production policies without fear of antitrust prosecution" (first internal
quotation marks omitted)); ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 1920,35-43 (Fordham Univ. Press 1995) (1966).
81 See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933) (interpreting the Sherman Antitrust Act to allow for consideration of the economic realities of each case in justifying the
denial ofan injunction against a price-fixing selling agent), overruled on othergrounds by Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
82 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-42 (1935) (holding portions
of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430,433
(1935) (holding portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, a statute created as part of the implementation of the National Recovery Act, and an Executive Order based upon the statute unconstitutional); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 120 (John
Q. Barrett ed., 2003) ("During the NRA experiment, there had been a pretty general suspension of
antitrust law activities. .. .").
83 See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 49 (2000) ("By the mid-1930s, the economic planning models that had
inspired great hope early in the New Deal had lost their luster. Franklin Roosevelt turned his ear toward
advisors who believed that competition was the key to economic restoration.").
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antitrust enforcement.' This revival then kicked into high gear during the
five-year tenure of Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust Division from
1938 to 1943.5
Under Jackson, Arnold, and their successors, the DOJ brought hundreds of criminal and civil actions in cartel and monopolization cases."
This activism expanded into the merger area as well after Congress strengthened Section 7 of the Clayton Act, amending it into its modern form in
1950.17 As a result of these government-prosecuted cases and numerous
additional private cases, antitrust law shifted toward more and more per se
rules," presumptions against monopolization," and a nearly absolute prohi-

8 See JACKSON, supra note 82, at 120-22 (explaining the tentative return to antitrust law after the
Supreme Court declared the NRA unconstitutional).
85

SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 78-110 (2005); Spencer Weber

Waller, The Story of Alcoa: The Enduring Questions of Market Power, Conduct, and Remedy in Monopolization Cases, in ANTITRUST STORIES 121, 126-27 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007)
[hereinafter Waller, The Story ofAlcoa].
86 See Thomas E. Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or
Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 87 & n.16 (1990) (noting that between the years 1940 and 1944,
the DOJ Antitrust Division filed 163 criminal cases, compared to 173 criminal cases between 1890 and
1940).
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
88 E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210 (1959) (holding that a
conspiracy between manufacturers and distributors not to sell, or to sell only on highly unfavorable
terms, was a type of restraint on trade that was per se illegal under Sections I and 2 of the Sherman
Act); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 3, 5 (1958) (holding that defendant railway's "preferential routing" agreements were among the "agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal" per se (first internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218-24 (1940) (mling that a conspiracy between oil companies to raise and
maintain spot market prices for gasoline was per se illegal).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108-10 (1948); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (explaining that once the United States had proven that
Alcoa had a monopoly of the relevant market, Alcoa then had the burden of proving that it had not
abused its power). See generallyWaller, The Story of Alcoa, supra note 85.
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bition of significant mergers of any kind.' Such limitations had far more
impact than the more modest corporate governance constraints of that era."1
One snapshot of this period can be found in The Corporationin Modern Society, a collection of essays edited by the economist Edward Mason
in 1960, written by prominent legal and economic scholars.' This collection reflects a time when antitrust rules were strong and corporate governance constraints weak.93 The primary concerns expressed are the oligopoly
status of key U.S. corporations and, more generally, the economic, political,
and social power of corporations.' Pure corporate governance concerns or
agency costs were at most a secondary theme of the book and a direct concern in perhaps two of the chapters in the volume."
Enter the market for corporate control. Professor (now Dean Emeritus)
Henry Manne argued in his seminal article in 1965 that overly stringent
antitrust rules against mergers did little to protect competition and, primarily, served to entrench inefficient management to the detriment of shareholders, consumers, and competition in general.' Manne directly cited
Berle and Means and their concern for the detrimental effects of the separation of ownership and management as one of the key bases for his proposals
90 E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 566-71 (1972) (upholding a district court
finding that Ford had violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, because Ford's purchase of Autolite substantially lessened competition in the market); Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967) (upholding the FTC order divesting
Procter & Gamble of Clorox Chemical Co. on the ground that it was a violation of the Clayton Act);
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966) (holding that a merger between Von's
and Shopping Bag violated the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act); United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 371-72 (1963) (holding the consolidation of two banks to be a violation of the CellerKefauver Antimerger Act); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345-46 (1962) (upholding
an injunction preventing a merger between two shoe companies even though the merged company
would have only 7.2 percent of the national retail shoe store market and 2.3 percent of the retail shoe
outlet market).
91 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 444 (2001) (discussing the "important strain of normative thought from the 1930s through the
1960s that extolled the virtues of granting substantial discretion to the managers of large business corporations").
92 THE CORPORATION INMODERN SOCIETY (Edward S. Mason ed., 6th prtg. 1966).
9 See Mark J. Roe, From Antitrust to Corporation Governance? The Corporation and the Law:
1959-1994, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 102, 102-04 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996).
94 E.g., Carl Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in THE CORPORATION
INMODERN SOCIETY 85, 89-90 (Edward S. Mason ed., 6th prtg. 1966).
9 Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in-THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 25, 39-45 (Edward S. Mason ed., 6th prtg. 1966) (discussing the concept of "shareholder democracy," and corporate power structures in different settings); Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom
andfor What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION INMODERN SOCIETY
46, 46-71 (Edward S. Mason ed., 6th prtg. 1966) (discussing historical and modem theories on how
corporations should be structured, and how power should be distributed within the corporation).
96 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 11920(1965).
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and stated that "the market for corporate control gives to these shareholders
both power and protection commensurate with their interest in corporate
affairs."" Later influential writings by Professor (now Judge) Frank Easterbrook, Professor Daniel Fischel, and others echoed these themes and advocated a robust takeover market as a way to constrain managerial inefficiency, to prevent rent seeking, and to increase shareholder value."
The calling for a well-developed market for corporate control required
important changes in both antitrust and corporate governance. At the time
of Henry Manne's original article, there were strong presumptions that any
merger that increased market concentration to any appreciable degree was
unlawful." It got to the point where Justice Potter Stewart noted in frustration that the only apparent consistency in challenges to mergers was that
"the [g]overnment always wins.""
This situation rapidly changed for antitrust in general and mergers in
particular. Most per se rules outside of the cartel area were abandoned in
favor of a broader, more economically intensive inquiry under the rule of
reason."' The plaintiff, rather than the defendant, was more clearly assigned

97 Id. at 112.
98 E.g., MACEY, supra note 8, at 118-26; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 711-14 (1982).

99 United States v. Phila. Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963) (describing "[tihe dominant
theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments [to §7] was a fear of what was
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy" (alterations in
original) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
la United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
101 E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-87 (2007) (explaining that the rule of reason is the most appropriate test to determine a violation of Section I of the Sherman Act, and courts should only resort to finding a practice unlawful per se when the result "would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output" (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Texaco Inc. v.
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (explaining that the Court interprets Section I of the Sherman Act as only
outlawing unreasonable restraints and "presumptively applies rule of reason analysis, under which
antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and
anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful" (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10-19
(1997))); Khan, 522 U.S. at 10-19 (explaining that under the rule of reason analysis, "the finder of fact
must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking
into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and effect" (citing Arizona
v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982))); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac.
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 291 (1985) (rejecting "a broad rule that the conduct of a cooperative venture-including a concerted refusal to deal-undertaken pursuant to a legislative mandate for
self-regulation is immune from per se scrutiny and subject to rule of reason analysis only if adequate
procedural safeguards accompany self-regulation"); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984) (explaining that under both a per se test and the rule of reason test, "the essential
inquiry remains the same-whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition"); Broad.
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the burden of proof that a defendant had meaningful monopoly power (or
nearly so) and had acted to harm competition without an offsetting business
justification.'02
In the merger area, the change was even more dramatic. The presumption of illegality when industry concentration increased was weakened.'o3
Government guidelines required a much greater degree of market concentration and a more rigorous analytical framework before the government
would seek to challenge most mergers. " The courts, in turn, began to hold
the government to these higher burdens of proof, although the guidelines on
their face only spoke to questions of prosecutorial discretion and not directly to case law and litigation.'o The rise of the market for corporate control
thus coincided with a weakening of merger control and even calls within
the Reagan administration in the 1980s to abolish Section 7 of the Clayton
Act entirely.'"
On the corporate governance side, important changes were happening
as well. Increased duties to maximize the value of the corporation emerged
once a meaningful bidding process had begun.'" On the other hand, the
courts were much less willing to limit corporations from enacting poison

Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7-8, 23-25 (1979) (holding that blanket licenses should be examined
under rule of reason analysis); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
102 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (holding that, under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, the Federal Government had the burden of proving that the defendant possessed (1)
"monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident").
103 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-98 (1974) (holding that small
increases in market share or market concentration "were not conclusive indicators of anticompetitive
effects").
104 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 4-10 (1968), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/lI 247.pdf (setting forth standards indicating when the DOJ would
likely challenge a proposed merger).
105 E.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v.
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d
1098, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120 (D.D.C.
2004).
I0 See ABA Antitrust Section Examines Deregulation, Enforcement Shifts, 49 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1224, at 160 (July 18, 1985) (summarizing Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge's call for repeal of Section 7 of the Clayton Act); Monopolies Subcommittee Receives Views on
Division's Enforcement Track Record, 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1206, at 455-58
(Mar. 14, 1985) (summarizing testimony before the House Judiciary Committee's Monopolies Subcommittee from the Reagan Administration on why Section 7 should be repealed).
107 See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994) ("Revlon reinforced the applicability of enhanced scrutiny and the directors' obligation to seek the best value
reasonably available for the stockholders where there is a pending sale of control, regardless of whether
or not there is to be a break-up of the corporation."); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
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pills and similar antitakeover devices that protected management." Finally,
a number of states enacted antitakeover statutes, most of which survived
court challenges."
In more recent times, the corporate scandals of the late 1990s, the new
millennium, and the ongoing financial crisis have led to other important
changes in corporate governance, often reactive to the crisis or scandal of
the moment."' The accounting and fraud scandals of the Enron era led to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and more intensive duties of Chief Executive Officers ("CEOs") and Chief Financial Officers in connection with the preparation and certification of financial statements."' The 2008 financial crisis
that began with the meltdown of the U.S. subprime mortgage market and
then spread throughout the United States and global economies led to a
series of financial reform measures enacted in the summer of 2010, all of
which contain regulatory, disclosure, and corporate governance proposals
of different kinds.112 As a result, in some areas of corporate governance, the
federal securities and regulatory provisions may have a far greater impact
on corporate boards and committees than the more-forgiving Delaware corporate law."
At the same time, antitrust law and enforcement appear to be experiencing a mild resurgence. Most commentators consider the Bush-era Antitrust Division to be relatively inactive on antitrust enforcement issues other
than criminal cartel enforcement, as well as hostile to most private antitrust
suits." 4 In contrast, almost immediately after taking power, the Obama adSee, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del. 1990); Moran
v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Del. 1985) (finding no violation of fiduciary duties in
a board's maintaining or approving poison pill).
109 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 82-84 (1987) (upholding an Indiana law
providing that the acquisition of controlling shares in a company does not automatically transfer voting
rights to the acquiring party unless a majority of all pre-existing, disinterested shareholders agree to the
transfer of voting power).
110 See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (explaining the connection between the Enron and WorldCom
scandals and the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and other corporate governance reform bills).
Ill Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (setting out the requirements of corporate responsibility for financial
reporters such as CEOs, CFOs, and other executives).
112 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
113 See, e.g., FANTO, supra note 20, § 3.3.2 (noting the way that the 1977 New York Stock Exchange scandal and the string of corporate scandals in the 1990s gave rise to the Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act,
which has a powerful effect on corporations' audit committees in particular).
114 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 903, 903-04, 911 (2009). There is a more complex picture at the
FTC during this period, which continued to bring a number of high profile civil nonmerger cases. Id. at
910-12 (comparing the FTC's record for litigating civil nonmerger cases with DOJ cases during the
Bush era, and finding that not only did the FTC start more litigation under the Bush Administration than
108
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ministration announced plans for more aggressive enforcement of the antitrust laws beyond the cartel area"' and has pursued a modestly expanded
array of investigations, cases, settlements, and amicus briefs in its two years
in office."'
What emerges is a pattern of oscillation. At most times over the past
120 years, the relative strengths of antitrust and corporate law have been
like two sine waves that only occasionally intersect; one field was on the
rise while the other was on the decline. We are at a rare historical intersection point where both fields are in positions of relative strength. Only time
will tell if that is a stable trend or merely another brief intersection as one
field is strengthened through legislation and court interpretation, and the
other weakened by the same developments. The continuing oscillation is
another explanation for the very rare crosstalk between these two fields,
both intimately concerned about corporate actors and their interaction in the
marketplace.
The current equilibrium, if it holds, is an equally rare opportunity to do
better."' When antitrust and corporate governance were out of sync, it was
the Clinton Administration (eight in the former, only four in the latter), but the DOJ has initiated zero
cases involving monopolization or attempted monopolization since 1999). One example of the difference in enforcement philosophies between the two agencies during this era was the Schering-Plough
case in which the FTC lost an attempted monopolization case at the appellate level and unsuccessfully
sought certiorari in the Supreme Court alone and against the express opposition of the Justice Department. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
548 U.S. 919 (2006). Another example is the refusal of the FTC to sign on to the now withdrawn report
issued by the DOJ's Antitrust Division proposing overly narrow standards for the imposition of liability
for unilateral conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf; see also Pamela Jones Harbour, Jon Leibowitz & J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'rs, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement of Commissioners
Harbour, Leibowitz and Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice, at
I (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/080908section2stmt.pdf ("Today the
Department of Justice ('the Department') issued a Report that, if adopted by the courts, would be a
blueprint for radically weakened enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. . . . The Federal Trade
Commission ('FTC') does not endorse the Department's Report.").
115 Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era 5-6, 8, 13-14 (May II, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711.pdf; see also Spencer Weber Waller & Jennifer
Woods, Antitrust Transitions, 32 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 189, 189-90 (2009).
116 John D. Harkrider, Obama: The First Year, ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 8, 9, 13 (reviewing
the statistics from the DOJ early in President Obama's administration and finding that there is, albeit
small, an uptick in antitrust enforcement).
117 There will always be areas of corporate governance like executive compensation, board selection and retention, shareholder voting, accounting rules, and audit procedures that only rarely implicate
competition policy. Although beyond the scope of this article, Professor Macey has identified the "cartelization" of stock exchanges, accounting firms, and credit rating agencies as an additional source of poor
corporate govemance. MACEY, supra note 8, at 112-17. By "cartelization," Professor Macey appears to
mean increased concentration and the creation of regulatory barriers to entry, rather than a literal private
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widely believed that these two bodies of law were substitutes."' Today, the
better view is that they are complements and should operate in a coordinated and consistent manner to promote the interests of both consumers and
shareholders."'

IV. TOWARDS A MORE MEANINGFUL INTERACTION
This Part looks at several of the more obvious and important areas
where an understanding of agency costs can inform the broader marketcompetition questions that antitrust law addresses, and vice versa. Woven
throughout the discussion is the critical area of corporate compliance law,
where the internal structure and operation of corporate entities can affect
their ability to comply with antitrust law (and other legal and regulatory
schemes) and to detect violations when they occur.
Section A of this Part introduces the general standards for corporate
compliance. Section B examines interlocking directorates, the only current
area where Congress has directly addressed by statute the intersection between antitrust and corporate governance. Section C looks at cartel policy,
where better governance principles and compliance policies can deter and
prevent the type of hard-core antitrust violations that constitute criminal
violations for the corporation and its officers, directors, and employees.
Section D looks beyond historical cartel issues into the murkier areas of the
anticompetitive agreements, which are not illegal per se, but are judged on a
case-by-case basis under the rule of reason. Section E looks at merger policy, an area where greater attention to corporate governance concerns illustrates certain weaknesses in current antitrust thinking. Finally, Section F
analyzes monopolization and attempted monopolization, where the uncertainties of what constitutes market power and its unlawful exercise are sufficiently vague and nuanced that the current regime of the business judgment rule in general seems appropriate.
conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of Section I of the Sherman Act. Id. Congress has recognized at least one piece of this competition and corporate governance puzzle with the passage of the
Credit Rating Duopoly Relief Act of 2006, H.R. 2990, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006). The effect of this statute
is still uncertain, but the dismal performance of the credit rating industry in the financial crisis of 2008
suggests that neither competition nor corporate governance has improved in this sector. See John Patrick
Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide Credit Crisis ": The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposalfor Improvement, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 109, 120-24 (2009)
(arguing that even if credit rating agencies "did not know what they were doing on a fundamental level,"
it probably would have been "in their interest to issue ratings on novel products anyway").
118 But see generally Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 497 (1992) (demonstrating the similarities between the two fields of law, but also pointing out the
distinct differences and why both are important for the economy).
119 See id. at 560-61 (arguing that antitrust, in combination with corporate governance law, can
work to the benefit of shareholders and corporate goals alike).
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CorporateCompliance

A.

Most courts have refused over the years to require that boards institute
compliance programs because "directors are entitled to rely on the honesty
and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on
suspicion that something is wrong."1 20 However, recent decisions signify a
shift in such ideology. First, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co.12' established a duty to act when directors become aware of "red flags"
(e.g., illegal or wrongful activities).122 This decision was Delaware's first to
address the extent to which directors must ensure legal compliance of the
company's officers and employees.123
A derivative suit alleged that the directors of Allis-Chalmers were liable for their employee's violations by reason of their failure to take action
to uncover and to prevent antitrust violations on the part of employees of
Allis-Chalmers. 24 The facts demonstrated that the directors had no actual
knowledge of any antitrust violations or even reason to know of any potential wrongdoing until government officials announced an investigation of
the company.125 The plaintiffs argued in the alternative that, by virtue of
their fiduciary duties, directors were bound to put a compliance system into
effect that would bring misconduct to their attention.126
The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed.' 27 The court reasoned that
precedent rejected imposing such a burden and noted that directors could
rely on the honesty and integrity of corporate employees in the absence of
red flags.128 Thus, the Allis-Chalmers directors were not liable for the actions of their subordinates.'29
Allis-Chalmers broke significant ground by recognizing that a director's fiduciary duties could include the duty to monitor; however, it provided little incentive for directors to actually "monitor." It is noteworthy
that the court, in creative language, refused to impose a duty "to install and

120
121
122

Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
Id. at 130 (interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court case of Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132
(1891), as supporting the proposition that corporate directors may become liable if their subordinates do
something "to put them on suspicion that something is wrong").
123 See Stephen F. Funk, In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation: Director Behavior, Shareholder Protection, and Corporate Legal Compliance, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 311, 312 (1997)
(describingAllis-Chalmers as "the definitive Delaware Supreme Court holding regarding the scope of a
corporate director's duty to monitor corporate affairs").
124

Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d at 127.

125

Id. at 128-29.

126

Id. at 130.

127
128

id.
id

129

Id. at 131.
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operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing."' In
other words, there was no duty to institute corporate compliance systems. In
1996, this changed.
In a groundbreaking shift in corporate governance, the Delaware Court
of Chancery in In re Caremark InternationalInc. Derivative Litigation"'
expanded a director's duty not only to act when exposed to obvious signs of
wrongdoing, but also to be informed and vigilant to uncover wrongdoing.'32
The decision stemmed from a federal investigation of "kickback" payments
to physicians in exchange for patient referrals."' Caremark eventually entered into a $250 million settlement.'" At that time, Chancellor Allen, the
author of the decision, saw an opportunity to require directors to oversee
legal issues."'
In approving the settlement, Chancellor Allen demonstrated that directors can no longer assume that the corporation was in compliance with the
law if no red flags arose.'36 Rather, they have a "duty to attempt in good
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the
board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses
caused by non-compliance.""' Chancellor Allen treated this duty as an extension of a director's duty to act in good faith, thereby preventing future
courts from second-guessing a director's business decisions."'
Under Caremark, to show bad faith, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
the board failed in a "sustained or systematic" fashion,"' for example an
"utter failure" by the board to develop a reasonable information reporting
system. " An actual failure to prevent wrongdoing does not, by itself, indicate that a board failed in its duty to monitor. 4 ' Even a grossly unreasonable failure to act does not meet the bad-faith threshold.'42
In Stone v. Ritter,'43 the Delaware Supreme Court reinforced, but narrowed the Caremark decision, placing directors' duty to monitor in line

130
131
132
133
134
135

Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d at 130.
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id. at 970.
Id. at 962 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 960-61.
Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors' Evolving Duty to

Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 325 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
136 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
137

138
139
140
141
142
143

Id.
Id. at 967.
Id. at971.
id.
Id. at 971-72.
Caremark,698 A.2d at 971 (noting that the test for liability is "quite high").
911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
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with the duty of good faith, a subset of the duty of loyalty.'" Under Stone,
directors breach their duty to monitor when they either "utterly fail[] to
implement any reporting or information system or controls" or if they "consciously fail[] to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves
from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention." 45
Stone stemmed from a derivative suit brought by AmSouth Bancorporation shareholders against the board for allowing employees to violate the
federal Bank Secrecy Act's reporting requirements.'" Although the court
affirmed Caremark's good-faith standard, it also identified a scienter requirement, stating that "imposition of liability requires a showing that the
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations."' 4 7
These key cases and the many that have followed in their wake establish three key principles: (1) a plaintiff must show scienter-that the board
acted with the actual or constructive knowledge that its inaction would
harm the corporation; and (2) the board is responsible for preventing
wrongful or illegal acts; but (3) the board is not responsible for monitoring
outcomes of decisions of previous boards.'48 Recent cases indicate courts'
greater willingness to infer knowledge of wrongdoing. In American International Group, Inc. v. Greenberg,'49 the court inferred the defendants'
knowledge from their high-level management positions, concluding that it
was unlikely that illegal transactions would have occurred without their
knowledge.'o
The duty of care generally requires that directors act in good faith and
with the degree of diligence, care, and skill that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances."' At the same time, the
business judgment rule "is a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company."' 52 The rule effectively prevents the judiciary from reviewing
after the fact most of the merits of a board's business decisions. Accordingly, a plaintiff challenging business decisions made by a corporate board on
an informed and good-faith basis bears the burden of rebutting the business
judgment rule presumption.'
144 Id. at 369-70.
145 Id. at 370.
146 Id. at 364-66.
147 Id. at 370 (citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
148 Eric. J. Pan, A Board's Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 717, 719-20 (2009-2010).
149 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009).
150 Id. at 795-99. But see In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124-26
(Del. Ch. 2009) (adopting a less expansive view of inferring knowledge of wrongdoing).
151 Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986).
152 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (en banc).
153 Id. at812.
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The business judgment rule does not protect all corporate action, however. First, the rule does not apply if a plaintiff can show that directors
acted with self-interest (e.g., self-dealing)." Second, the rule does not apply where directors abdicate their responsibility or when they fail to act, for
example in failing to monitor cases.' Third, the rule does not apply to decisions lacking a rational business purpose.' Courts make this determination from the vantage point of the directors at the time of the directors' decision, not with hindsight.' Fourth, the rule does not protect decisions involving gross negligence.'" In the event that the business judgment rule
does not apply, the board must prove the "entire fairness" of the transaction. '
The business judgment rule rests largely on the presumption that directors (business professionals)-rather than courts-boast the business acumen required to sufficiently assess the economic risk associated with their
often complex decisions.'" The rule protects directors from liability for
errors or mistakes in judgment, thereby ensuring corporations freedom to
make their own rational and informed judgments without fear that the benefit of hindsight will lead to a backlash. Thus, the rule immunizes the substance of a decision derived from diligent and informed analysis.'"'
"Process" is essential in determining whether the board acted with due diligence.'62
When applied to antitrust, this analysis reveals critical, but unresolved
issues. First, what is a sufficient monitoring system demonstrating that the
board has, in good faith, required monitoring and compliance systems that
reasonably can be expected to deter, detect, and prevent serious antitrust
violations by the officers, employees, and directors of the corporation?
Second, what are the red flags necessary for the board to take further action
when unlawful conduct may have occurred? Finally, how do the duties of
154
155
156

id
Id. at 813.
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66 (summarizing the business judgment rule and the relevance of a
rational business purpose in decisions by directors).
157 See I ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, § 4.01(c) cmt. c, at 167-68.
158 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (en banc) (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at
812), overruled on other grounds by Gander v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (en banc), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010); see also Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of
Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 343, 346-49 (2006) (describing the egregiously negligent conduct of Van
Gorkom).
159 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted), modifiedon other grounds by 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
160 See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 2:10, at 2-36 (2009 & Supp. 2010); Daniel R. Fischel,
The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1439, 1441 (1985).
161 See BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 160, §2:10, at 2-34.
162 See id. § 2:10, at 2-37 to -40 (noting that exceptions to the business judgment rule apply when
directors fail to engage in required procedures for making business decisions).
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care, the requirement of adequate monitoring and compliance systems, and
the business judgment rule interact when the board fails to take action and
the corporation is subsequently found guilty, is found liable, or chooses to
settle allegations of substantial antitrust wrongdoing?
The case law and commentary provide surprisingly few clues." The
answer likely differs depending on which area of antitrust and which type
of violation is at issue. The following Sections discuss the nature of red
flags and board duties for the most common types of antitrust violations.
They then suggest that the highest standard should be imposed with respect
to cartel-type violations, the lowest for monopolization-type offenses, and
an intermediate standard for mergers.
B.

Interlocking Directorates

The only direct statutory interplay between corporate governance and
competition policy can be found in Section 8 of the Clayton Act, which
states:
(a)(1) No person shall, at the same time, serve as a director or officer in any two corporations
(other than banks, banking associations, and trust companies) that are(A) engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and
(B) by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any
of the antitrust laws .... 1

This provision is limited to corporations above a certain size whose competitive sales are above a certain threshold.'65 Only interlocking directorates
between horizontal competitors are covered by this provision, despite its
wording suggesting that interlocking directorates between vertically related
corporations would be subject to this provision as well.'" Section 8 also

163 In contrast, the issue has received much more comprehensive treatment in the United Kingdom
where the UK competition enforcer, the Office of Fair Trading, has produced an excellent and recent
comprehensive study of corporate compliance in competition law. See generally OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING, DRIVERS OF COMPLIANCE AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH COMPETITION LAW (2010), availa-

ble at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/reports/comp policy/oft1 227.pdf.
'64 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2006).
165 Id. These limits are indexed to inflation and currently Section 8 of the Clayton Act only applies
if the corporations have "capital, surplus, and undivided profits" above $25,841,000 each and where
competitive sales are above $2,584,100 and at least two percent of that corporation's total sales or the
competitive sales of each corporation are at least four percent of that corporation's total sales. See id.;
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Commission Announces Revised Filing Thresholds for Clayton Act
Antitrust Reviews (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/01/hsr-safeharbor.shtm.
166 In re TRW, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 325, 379 (1979), af'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. TRW, Inc. v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 647 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981).
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does not reach interlocking directorates between bank and non-bank corporations.6 7
Although there are occasionally boundary issues as to whether corporations should be deemed horizontal competitors,'" or whether the statute
reaches situations where the corporation owns competing subsidiaries, the
statute is straightforward enough. It thus represents a per se ban on a limited
number of types of horizontal interlocking directorates.'69 The statute requires no proof of competitive effects.
As a result, individuals and corporations simply act accordingly in the
real world and there is not much litigation. 7 o When disputes arise, the usual
remedy is the resignation of a director from one of the two competing enterprises or occasionally the divestiture of a business line so the firms are
no longer competing and no longer subject to the law's provisions. Sometimes the remedy is embodied in a consent decree depending on the stage of
the investigation or litigation.
Most recently, Eric Schmidt, then the CEO of Google, resigned as a
director of Apple to address questions about whether his dual service on the
boards of both companies violated this provision. 1' Press reports indicate
that the FTC is continuing to investigate whether other board-level interlocks between these two actual and potential competitors raise similar issues.172
Preventing conflicts of interest and creating proper incentives for directors underlie this entirely sensible, but limited, provision. Interlocking
167

Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 (1983); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES: HANDBOOK ON SECTION 8 OF THE CLAYTON ACT 76-78 (2011);
Amy Corton, Bankamerica v. United States-Legitimizing Bank-Nonbank Interlocks, 33 EMORY L.J.
1103, 1105 (1984); Arthur H. Travers, Jr., FinancialInstitution Interlocks After the Bankamerica Case,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 1067, 1069 (1984-1985).
168 See generally Benjamin M. Gerber, Enabling Interlock Benefits While PreventingAnticompetitive Harm: Toward an Optimal Definition of Competitors Under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 24 YALE
J. ON REG. 107 (2007).
169 See William C. MacLeod, Interlocks at the FederalTrade Commission: Room for Reason in a
"PerSe " Statute?, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 1077, 1079-80, 1083 (1984-1985); Recent Developments, Clayton Act Prohibitionof Interlocking Directoratesin Industrialor Commercial Corporations,54 COLUM.
L. REV. 130, 130-31 (1954).
170 Cases involving challenges to interlocking directorates under Section 8 of the Clayton Act are
collected in I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 426-31 & nn.604644 (6th ed. 2007).
171 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement of Bureau of Competition Director Richard
Feinstein Regarding the Announcement That Google CEO Eric Schmidt Has Resigned from Apple's
Board
(Aug.
3,
2009)
[hereinafter
Feinstein
Statement],
available
at
http://www.fic.gov/opa/2009/08/googlestmt.shtm; Despite Google's Schmidt Resignation from Apple
Board, FTC Investigation Continues; Gore Next to Go?, MACDAiLYNEWS.COM (Aug. 3, 2009, 4:37
PM) [hereinafter MACDAiLYNEWS.COM],
http://macdailynews.com/2009/08/03/despite googles
schmidt resignation from apple board_ftc investigation cont.
172 See, e.g., Feinstein Statement, supranote 171; MACDAtLYNEWS.COM, supra note 171.
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directorates between competitors can pose both competition and corporate
governance problems. They can exacerbate the agency cost problems when
a director's decisions can benefit his interests in his other role with the
competitor rather than serve the best interests of the shareholders at the
company where he serves as a director. At an extreme, they can be a direct
violation of the duty of loyalty for either or both of the corporations where
the director serves.
These concerns must also be balanced against the value of knowledgeable, experienced directors who have the ability to play an important, engaged role as outside directors to minimize the agency costs. This is the
avowed goal of corporate governance law in the first place. 173If the statute
operates as intended obviously a certain number of highly qualified directors will be excluded, and publicly traded companies will have to find outside directors from a different and narrower pool of candidates.174
On the competition side of the fence, the dangers can be equally
straightforward. Interlocking directorates could facilitate outright collusion,"' but could also be a facilitating mechanism either for the exchange of
information or for other means of oligopolistic coordination and tacit collusion. Interlocking directorates can also affect key board-level decisions
involving mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, entry into new markets,
innovation initiatives, and other key strategic determinations that can affect
the competitive efforts of one, or both, of the affected firms."'
The current statute, while not perfect, is nonetheless an appropriate
compromise. It can be both over- and underinclusive in particular settings.
Section 8 also does not precisely define competing firms, which raises issues for companies with operations in multiple markets and for companies
where the boundaries of even specialized operations are evolving rapidly,
as in the high-tech sector."' However, further precision would probably
come at such a high cost that the incremental gains would not be worthwhile for either competition policy or corporate governance. What emerges
from this discussion is the real utility that can be gained when Congress, the
courts, and commentators thoughtfully address these two separate legal
spheres in a unified manner. If the prohibition of interlocking directorates is
a qualified success, then the failure to integrate corporate governance and
competition policy in more pressing areas of concern is a troubling example
of the failure to unify these two areas of the law.
173 See Gerber, supra note 168, at 112-15; Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware's
CorporationLaw, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 655-56 (2008).
174 See Gerber, supra note 168, at 112-13.
175 See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REv. 515, 583-84 (2004)
(discussing the historical use of interlocking directorates as a tnust facilitating device).
176 Cf Mehdi Farhadi, How Major Public-ListedBlue Chip Enterprises in Germany Protect Themselves from Hostile Takeovers by Foreign Investors Through Networks of Interlocking Directorates 34,
11 (Mar. 3,2008), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-1262660 (working paper).
177 See Gerber, supra note 168, at 118.
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Cartels

Perhaps the most important area of corporate compliance relates to the
deterrence, prevention, detection, and response to credible allegations of
price fixing, bid rigging, and related cartel behavior. These are the hardcore cartel offenses that are per se unlawful and that the Antitrust Division
normally prosecutes as criminal violations."' The conspiracy itself is the
offense, and no proof of effect is required."' In essence, these per se unlawful conspiracies are presumed unreasonable and no rebuttal evidence is
permitted as to their intended or actual effect.'8 0 The Supreme Court has
gone so far as to suggest that cartels are "public enemy number one" for
antitrust purposes."s'
Whether or not this is literally true,' 82 criminal conviction (and even
investigation) holds heavy consequences for the corporations and individuals involved. Section I of the Sherman Act makes an antitrust crime a felony."' The criminal penalties for a corporation are fines up to the higher of
$100 million or double the gain or loss involved in the offense.'" Fines for
cartel offenses have reached as high as $500 million, and there are dozens
of fines in excess of $100 million.'
For individuals, the monetary penalties are smaller, but the stakes are
even higher. Individuals, unlike corporations, are subject to imprisonment,
not just heavy fines. A violation of Section 1 can result in a prison term of
up to ten years.'" Virtually every conviction in modern times has resulted
in a prison term for corporate employees, officers, and directors, ranging

178
179
180
181

See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001).
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also cases cited supra note 88.
See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)
(referring to collusion as "the supreme evil of antitrust").
182 See Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
497, 497-99 (2009) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court considers cartels more of a concern than monopolistic behavior).
183 15 U.S.C. § 1.
184 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).
185 See Hammond, supra note 39, at 5-6.
186 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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from relatively low-level employees to Presidents and CEOs.'" The longest
prison term to date has been 46 months.'"8
The criminal prosecution is often just the beginning of the troubles for
the firms involved. A conviction or guilty plea in a government criminal
case is prima facie evidence of liability in any follow-up civil treble damage
litigation.'" A plaintiff would only need to prove standing, causation, and
damages in order to receive treble damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.'"
Many of these actions are filed in the form of a class action, which further
raises the stakes. Settlements by codefendants are deducted pretrebling.19 1
In pari delicto defenses are not allowed.'92 Liability is joint and several.'93
Contribution claims among defendants are not allowed,'" although contractual judgment-sharing agreements have been allowed.'" Further, to the extent that an antitrust violation can be deemed an intentional crime or tort,
antitrust judgments may not be insurable.'"
One of the government's most effective anti-cartel tools is the amnesty-and-leniency program, which has been widely copied abroad.'" Beginning in the early 1990s, the DOJ adopted a set of formal written guidelines
setting forth when the government would grant immunity for cartel participants who informed the Antitrust Division of cartel activity and provided
187 Cf Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., A
Review of Recent Cases and Developments in the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program
(Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/10862.pdf (noting a trend toward more frequently imposed and longer average prison sentences for antitrust offenders, with the
average prison sentence in 2002 being fifteen months); THE INFORMANT! (Warner Bros. Pictures 2009)
(providing a fictionalized account of an actual international cartel agreement for food additives reaching
into higher executive and board ranks of conspirators, which resulted in jail time for those convicted).
188

2 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD

§ 15.3,

at 15-6

(3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2010).
189 15 U.S.C. § 16.
190
191

See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971); LAWRENCE A.

SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK

§

17.8b, at

1008 (2d ed. 2006).
192 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968), overruled on other
grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
193 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 394 (4th Cir. 1982).
194
195

Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-46 (1981).
Christopher R. Leslie, Judgment-SharingAgreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 749 (2009).

196 See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS

§

15.3, at 416 (3d

prtg. 1994) ("It appears that all states prohibit indemnity for intentional torts."). Some states would go
further and bar insurability of antitrust treble damage verdicts as punitive damages. See id. § 7.3, at 24950, § 15.3, at 417 (noting that jurisdictions are divided over the insurability of punitive damages and that
some jurisdictions disallow them unless the punitive liability is "imposed for activity that falls comfortably short of an intentional tort"). See generally 17 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 49:115 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing insurance coverage of intentional criminal acts).
197 See Hammond, supra note 39, at 3.
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truthful cooperation going forward.'" Under the amnesty-and-leniency program, corporations and individuals receive immunity from criminal prosecution if:
1. At the time the corporation comes forward to report the illegal activity, the Division has
not received information about the illegal activity being reported from any other source;
2. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, took prompt and
effective action to terminate its part in the activity;
3. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full,
continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation;
4. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to isolated confessions
of individual executives or officials;
5. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and
6. The corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.'"

If a corporation qualifies for leniency, then directors, officers, and employees of the corporation, like the corporation itself, will not be charged
criminally if they admit their wrongdoing with "candor and completeness"
and continue to assist the Division throughout the investigation.200
Immunity from criminal prosecution will not shield the corporation
from private-damage suits. In fact, it normally makes settlement of subsequent private litigation for cartel overcharges almost inevitable since the
corporation has confessed its guilt and provided assistance to the DOJ in the
prosecution of the other cartel members. In order to enhance the incentives
to take advantage of the amnesty-and-leniency program and to turn against
other cartel members, Congress subsequently passed legislation providing
that cooperating firms normally would only be liable for single damages for
private litigation in connection with the cartel activity subject to a grant of
immunity under the amnesty-and-leniency program.20 ' As a result of the
combined incentives of the amnesty-and-leniency program, the vast majority of recent large domestic and international cartel cases have originated
from cartel members who have defected and disclosed the cartel to the Antitrust Division pursuant to the program.202 At least thirty foreign jurisdictions have adopted similar programs, further increasing the incentives to
198

See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS (1994), available at

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.pdf;
POLICY

(1993)

[hereinafter

CORPORATE

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY
LENIENCY

POLICY],

available

at

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf.
199 CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 198, § A. Alternative discretionary conditions for
granting immunity are set forth in Section B of the policy. Id. § B.
200 id§c.
201 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237,
§ 213(a), 118 Stat. 665, 666 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) and accompanying note).
Limitation of liability to single damages is contingent on "satisfactory cooperation" by the corporation.
See id. § 213(b).
202 See Hammond, supra note 39, at 3.
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turn in fellow cartel members in exchange for immunity or leniency, while
complicating the process of coordinating the different procedural and substantive requirements of each program.203
The growth of amnesty-and-leniency programs is just part of the growing international consensus that price fixing, bid rigging, and related offenses should be deemed hard-core cartel offenses, should be illegal under
national or regional law, and should be vigorously investigated and punished by the relevant competition authority. For example, the more than
thirty nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") recognized that "hard core cartels are the most egregious
violations of competition law" and that "[e]ffective action against hard core
cartels is particularly important from an international perspective." 2" The
1998 OECD recommendation advises member countries to ensure that their
competition laws effectively halt and deter hard-core cartels by providing
for "effective sanctions and adequate enforcement procedures and institutions to detect and remedy hard core cartels."205
Most of the major competition law jurisdictions now take a similar
tough stance on cartel activity. Although the European Union does not criminalize cartel activity or impose individual liability, it does impose fines
of up to 10 percent of the worldwide annual turnover of the enterprises involved.20 6 These fines have often equaled or exceeded the criminal fines
imposed by the United States in connection with the same cartel operating
in both jurisdictions.207 Although penalties and the level of enforcement
differ, an increasing number of countries, including Canada, the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Brazil, and Australia, are enacting and enforcing criminal price-fixing provisions208 and/or are seeking to create meaningful private9rights of actions for the victims of price fixing and related cartel activi20
ty.

203 See J. Anthony Chavez, International Cartel Enforcement: Creating a Fear of Detection, in 2
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE 2010: DEVELOPMENTS & HOT TOPICS 929, 964-65, 975-78 (Practising Law Inst.

ed., 2010).
204

ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEv., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING

EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST HARD CORE CARTELS 2 (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf.
205 Id. at intro.
206 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002, art. 23,2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 17 (implementing the rules on competition set out in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty).
207 Compare 2 WALLER, supra note 188, § 16.2, at 16-15 (noting that the European Union has
imposed fines in the hundreds of millions of Euros for illegal cartels), with supra note 185 and accompanying text (noting that the United States has imposed dozens of fines over $100 million for illegal
cartels).
208 Chavez, supra note 203, at 965.
209 See, e.g., Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules,
at 3, 10, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://eur-Iex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0165:FIN:EN:PDF.
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The criminal penalties levied against corporations and other business
entities, imprisonment of key corporate officers and employees, potential

disqualification of directors, and overall financial consequences as well as
collateral debarments from doing business with certain public sector customers, are all frequently material to the financial performance of the corporation and may be required to be reported to the SEC and disclosed to the
public. This in turn raises additional concerns under federal securities regulation and increases the potential for shareholder derivative and class-action
litigation.
This suggests that there are unique red flags associated with the role of
corporate boards in connection with cartel-type activity. First, the decision
to apply for leniency is normally a board decision. Second, for a board to
consider, and then to reject, the idea of applying for unconditional amnesty
would be condoning a criminal felony; this action would automatically constitute a breach of the board's fiduciary duty. The business judgment rule
would not protect such a decision.210 Board members would be exposed to
significant liability in shareholder derivative litigation and, conceivably, as
aiding and abetting the conspiracy in the underlying antitrust violation. In
addition, rejecting a chance at unconditional amnesty is to risk another
member of the cartel having the opportunity to seek amnesty, receive the
benefits, and place the first corporation in the difficult position of almost
certainly having to defend both criminal and civil litigation, with a different
cartel member obliged to truthfully and fully cooperate with the government at every step of the process.
But this first scenario of outright rejection of an opportunity for amnesty is both extreme and unlikely. Intermediate scenarios include situations where it becomes publicly known that another member of the industry
in the United States or abroad has sought or received amnesty in connection
with cartel activity. Once again, it is probably too late to take action, although the possibility of a discretionary amnesty application (or application
in another jurisdiction) is still available. However, in the real world, amnesty is probably too late and the board's choices are limited to contesting liability if the facts and law warrant, or seeking a guilty plea with a reduced
sentence and fine as the only practical alternative.
Other real world variations of potential red flags for board consideration include: the execution of a search warrant or dawn raid of company
premises, the receipt of a grand-jury subpoena, the receipt of a civil investigative demand, press reports of grand-jury or civil-antitrust investigations,
the filing of a civil class action, individual treble damages, or civil governmental cases, a history of prior antitrust violations, the receipt of a demand
210 See I ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, § 4.01, at 144 ("[A] director or officer violates the duty
to perform his or her functions in good faith if he or she knowingly causes the corporation to disobey the
law."); FANTO, supra note 20, § 2.23(c), at 2-52 to -53 ("[Tlhe business judgment rule offers no protection to directors who make a decision knowingly to violate the law.").
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letter threatening litigation, disturbing results from an antitrust audit or other internal investigation or compliance program, the surfacing of an internal
whistleblower, customer complaints of anticompetitive conduct, and so on
down to unsubstantiated rumor and innuendo. In most of these variations, it
is likely that a corporate board was not aware of the cartel activity or the
corporation's participation in the cartel until it was too late. But the question for corporate governance, corporate compliance, corporate responsibility, and director liability is what should the board have known, and when
should they have known it.
Even in the absence of these legal and regulatory red flags, there are
business, economic, and industry factors that should trigger a corporate
board to at least reflect on whether something more needs to be done. Antitrust economists are in broad agreement that some of the industry dynamics
that are prone to collusion include: a small number of players, a homogenous product, price transparency, widespread exchange of information
among competitors, heavy contacts between competitors in a trade association or other context, and/or signaling through the press and public announcements about future pricing and production.21 ' When such factors are
part of the daily life of the corporation and its competitors, willful ignorance should not be a shield for liability.
Cases like Caremark and Stone establish that a corporation should
have meaningful, effective compliance programs, and the board should be
aware of those programs and involved such that the compliance program
functions properly. No case suggests that the mere fact that illegal activity
occurred, by itself, constitutes a breach of the board's duties toward the
shareholder no matter how dire the consequences to the corporation or the
shareholders. And yet, something more than setting up a compliance program in good faith and then ceasing to pay attention is required.
However, the danger is that the current legal structure creates incentives to engage in what Professor Daniel Sokol has dubbed "cosmetic compliance."212 The risk is that the corporations will engage in just enough
compliance efforts to avoid legal liability without actually detecting anything, lest the board then be required to actually do something about it in
order to avoid liability. 213
The federal, criminal sentencing guidelines provide some additional
guidance. 214 These sentence guidelines were mandatory at one time, but
now serve as voluntary guidelines to reduce sentencing disparities for fed211

See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 180-

93 (2d ed. 1994).
212 D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About
Public and Private Enforcement, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2011-2012) (manuscript at 30) (on
file with author).
213 Id. (manuscript at 46).
214 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

8B2.1(a)-(b) (2010).
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eral criminal offenses.2 15 They indicate that the existence of an effective
compliance and ethics program (or lack thereof) will affect the culpability
score of the corporate defendant, which will in turn impact the amount of
the applicable criminal fine for all federal corporate criminal convictions,
including antitrust.2 16 In addition, courts normally require the maintenance
of an effective compliance and ethics program as a term of a corporate defendant's probation.217
In order to qualify as an effective compliance and ethics program, the
organization must: "(1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; and (2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law." 218
Due diligence in this context means that the board of directors, as the
governing authority of the corporation, "shall be knowledgeable about the
content and operation of the compliance and ethics program and shall exercise reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program."21 9 After establishing and promoting the program, the organization must also take reasonable steps to
make sure that the program is being followed, including monitoring and
auditing. This requires periodically evaluating the program, creating mechanisms for the anonymous and/or confidential reporting of violations, and
taking reasonable steps to respond appropriately to criminal conduct.220 Together, these requirements lay out a roadmap, but not an instruction manual,
for corporate boards that are serious about effective compliance in the cartel
context and other areas of federal criminal law for corporations.
There also is the possibility of director disqualification. While SEC
regulations bar any unfit person from serving in an executive position in a
publicly held company, 221 no such explicit statutory authority exists in the
antitrust area in the United States. However, director disqualification for
competition law violations is governed by statute in the United Kingdom
and elsewhere.22 2 In the 2002 UK Enterprise Act, there is the possibility of

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (5-4 decision).
216 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f(1).
217 Id § 8B2.1(b)(7).
218 Id. § 8B2.1(a)(I)-(2).
219 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A).
220 Id § 8B2.I(b)(5)(B)-(C), (b)(7); see also Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Antitrust Screening:
Making Compliance Programs Robust 3-10 (July 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1648948 (suggesting statistical techniques for screening company data).
221 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (2006).
222 Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46, § 9, sch. I (U.K.); Canadian Business
Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 (Can.); see also Jassmine Girgis, CorporateDirectors'Disqualification: The New CanadianRegime?, 46 ALTA. L. REV. 677, 685 (2009). But see generally Johannes
Schmidt, The Case for a European Competition Disqualification Order, 8 ZErrScHRIFT FIR
WETTBEWERBSRECHT
(ZWeR)
378
(2010),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
215
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the Office of Fair Trading ("OFT") applying for a Competition Disqualification Order, in addition to the other penalties provided for when a violation of the UK or EU competition rules occurs.2" Here, too, the ultimate test
is whether the director is unfit to manage a company.224
The OFT recently has issued revised guidelines indicating when they
are likely to use these provisions in the future." Normally, the OFT will
require a prior definitive decision that a competition violation has occurred,226 although it has the power in exceptional circumstances to proceed
even in the absence of a prior violation.227 The guidelines also suggest it
will normally seek director disqualification only for the more serious competition violations.
While the director disqualification process is likely to be used for situations where the director has actively participated in the violation, the more
interesting sections of the guidelines pertain to those directors who "ought
to have known" about the violations.229 While no bright-line rule is possible,
the OFT will take into account such factors as the director's role, position,
knowledge, skill, experience, responsibilities, and available information, as
well as the relationship between those factors and the persons responsible
for the violations.230 While this is not inconsistent with the general guide23
' it is more specific, more focused
lines provided by cases like Caremark,
on competition issues, and represents a middle ground between draconian
personal liability and virtual immunity under the U.S. business judgment
rule.
There are no equivalent statutes or guidelines in the United States for
competition offenses. Seeking such a statutory amendment would be helpful, but it appears to be politically unrealistic. Even in the absence of specific statutory authority, there is the possibility of barring certain directors,
officers, and employees from the company or industry for varying lengths
of time as part of court judgments and consent decrees for fraud and serious
papers.cfm?abstract id=1761509 (commenting that director disqualification for antitrust violations has
not yet been codified as statute in the EU).
223 Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 204 (U.K.).
224 Id
225

OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, DIRECTOR DISQUALIFICATION ORDERS IN COMPETITION CASES: AN

OFT GUIDANCE DOCUMENT § 4.2, at 7 (2010) [hereinafter OFT GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/business-leaflets/enterprise act/oft5I0.pdf.
226 Id. § 4.6, at 8.
227 Id. § 4.7, at 8.
228 Id.§4.11,at9.
229 Id. §§ 4.22 to.23, at 1-12.
230 Id. § 4.22, at I1. In addition, the guidance indicates that the OFT normally would not seek
disqualification of any director of a company that has benefitted from leniency. OFT GUIDELINES, supra
note 225, §§ 4.12 to .13, at 9. The OFT reserves the right to seek disqualification if the director was
personally involved in the offense, opposed the amnesty application, or failed to cooperate with the
resulting investigation. Id §§ 4.14, at 9-10, 4.20, at I1.
231 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970-72 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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regulatory violations.232 From time to time, guilty pleas in antitrust cases
have included similar language, but no systematic practice or plan appears
to be at work.3 The adoption of formal or informal versions of the UK
statute and OFT guidelines would go a long way to filling the void left by
state and federal law when corporate boards have failed to act because they
failed to notice that anything was amiss until it was too late. As Judge
Douglas Ginsburg and Professor Joshua Wright further note, increasing
personal responsibility (rather than corporate fines) may be the only way
both to increase deterrence and to minimize agency costs.2 3
Another key is the creation of a meaningful compliance program both
for antitrust and other legal and regulatory risks.235 Although, in theory,
having a compliance program and then violating it could cut against a corporation or director, it does not work that way in practice. Both the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and the OFT director disqualification guidelines
provide benefits and protections to corporations that have such programs
and do not impose special burdens on the officers and directors who create
or supervise those good-faith compliance programs.
The ultimate questions are: What types of cartel red flags should a
board ignore at its peril? When ought a board to know that something is
amiss? What should be the penalties if they violate these duties? No brightline rules emerge for the honest and well-meaning board member who has
not actually participated in the violation. The case law, however, leaves
much to be desired, and comparisons with foreign practice and other areas
of U.S. law enforcement and regulatory experience require particularization
for the competition area.
At a minimum, directors need to be aware of the per se illegality and
penalties for price fixing, bid rigging, market division, customer allocation,
and similar cartel activity. No officer or director can participate in such
232 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (2006). Courts have imposed such penalties, but not in all
cases. See SEC v. Farrell, No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1996) (considering, but declining to grant, petitioner's request to permanently bar director from industry); SEC v.
Florafax Int'l, Inc., Litig. Release No. 10,617, 31 SEC DOCKET 1038, 1040 (Nov. 27, 1984) (imposing
three-year bar on consent without admitting liability); Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Revised Permanent
Injunction and Final Order as to Defendant Tarzenea Dixon at 3-4, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Your Money
Access, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-05147-ER (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2009), 2009 WL 5177847 (permanently enjoining a defendant individual from payment processing, including Automated Clearing House ("ACH")
debits and credit card transactions); Consent Decree at 6, United States v. DC Credit Servs., Inc.,
No. 02-5115 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/dcsconsent.pdf (permanently enjoining defendant from debt collection and assisting in debt collection activities).
233 See, e.g., In re Hoechst Celanese Corp., No. 9216, 1991 WL 639945, at *20 (F.T.C. Aug. 23,
1991).
234

Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L. 3,

19-20 (2010).
235 Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34
J. CoRP. L. 679, 690-91 (2009) (describing the history and development of corporate compliance programs for antitrust violations and other legal issues).
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activity, cover up such activity, or knowingly allow any person to do so on
behalf of the company. Board members must create meaningful corporatecompliance programs, relying on trained professionals, to deter, prevent,
and detect such activity and ensure that compliance programs are instituted
and taken seriously at every level of the corporation. Training must be regular and ongoing at all levels of the corporation. Compliance audits, screening techniques, and revisions to the compliance program will be required
from time to time. Whistleblowers must be encouraged and not punished.
Credible complaints of wrongdoing, from any source, must be taken seriously. Prompt action by the board will be required if credible allegations
of violations appear from any of these sources.
When board members show such vigilance, then they should be protected from personal liability-and the corporation from shareholder litigation-when genuinely unexpected violations are shown to have occurred.
When board members do not act diligently, then officers, directors, and
corporations should not be able to hide behind overly generous protections
from state corporate law doctrines that were designed to address more
mundane duties and harms.
Governance and the Rule of Reason

D.

Corporate governance issues affect a host of other issues also governed by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Any agreement that unreasonably
restricts competition is unlawful under Section 1236 As discussed above,
only a handful of agreements are per se unreasonable and are normally
prosecuted criminally. The rest are judged under a broader rule of reason
analysis on a case-by-case basis and are the subject of civil litigation if
challenged by either the government or private parties.
Corporate governance issues arise as to both whether there is even an
agreement between two economically independent economic actors and
whether any such agreements unreasonably restrict competition. For example, most sports leagues are comprised of individual franchises owned by
competing owners or groups.237 These economically independent (but interdependent) teams compete both on and off the field economically, but cooperate in the creation and maintenance of the league itself. As a result, most
sports leagues are subject to normal antitrust review unless protected by a
statutory or judicial immunity.238
236 15 U.S.C. § 1(2006).
237

Howard M. Wasserman, Fans, Free Expression, and the Wide World of Sports, 67 U. PrrT. L.
REv. 525, 541 (2006).
238 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (holding that particular practices of the
NFL were immune from antitrust laws under the labor exemption); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01, 103 (1984) (holding that the NCAA television rules should be
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In contrast, several professional sports leagues have organized themselves as single entities owning all franchises and player rights in order to
avoid even constituting a "contract, combination . .. or conspiracy" within
the meaning of Section I of the Sherman Act. 239 The most prominent of
these peculiar structures for a sports league premised on competition between teams was Major League Soccer, which switched to a more traditional ownership structure several years after its creation over concerns that the
relative lack of success of the business model outweighed the minimal risks
associated with being subject to Section I of the Sherman Act. 2 1 Similar
issues were raised in the recent American Needle, Inc. v. NFL24 ' Supreme
Court decision, where an arrangement between NFL Properties and its licensing operations was held to be an agreement within the meaning of Section 1 since it involved decisions by economically independent actors. 242
Corporate governance can also affect not only whether Section I of the
Sherman Act applies, but also which test a court will apply in judging the
legality of the agreement. The Supreme Court was clear in its unanimous
decision in American Needle that some types of agreements are necessary
in order to create professional sports and other joint enterprises in the first
place.243 As a result, some form of the rule of reason must be applied to
such agreements and most will be held not to unreasonably restrict competition after a full examination of the pro- and anticompetitive aspects of the
particular agreement. 24
These types of corporate governance issues came to the forefront of
antitrust in the Visa/MasterCard litigation brought by both the federal government and massive private treble-damage antitrust class actions.245 While
judged under the rule of reason); Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (holding that the NFL
enjoyed no special antitrust immunity); Fed. Baseball Club of Bait., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922) (holding that professional baseball was not interstate commerce
and therefore beyond the scope of the commerce clause and the Sherman Act); Fishman v. Estate of
Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 543 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that certain actions of the late owner of the Chicago
NBA franchise violated the Sherman Act).

239

15 U.S.C. § 1.

240

See Chris Sagers, American Needle, Dagher, and the Evolving Antitrust Theory of the Firm:
What Will Become of Section l?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, August 2009, at 3, 5 & n.24, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishinglantitrustsource/Aug09_Sagers8_12f.authchec
kdam.pdf.
241 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
242 Id. at 2212-13 (noting that each of the thirty-two NFL teams is a "substantial, independently
owned, and independently managed business").
243 Id. at 2214 ("Any joint venture involves multiple sources of economic power cooperating to
produce a product. And for many such ventures, the participation of others is necessary.").
244 Waller, supra note 41, at 705-06; Herbert Hovenkamp, American Needle and the Boundaries of
the Firm 7-10 (Aug. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1616625.
245

LLOYD CONSTANTINE, PRICELESS: THE CASE THAT BROUGHT DOWN THE VISAlMASTERCARD

BANK CARTEL 92-93 (2009).
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the governance arrangements within and between Visa and Mastercard have
been characterized as cartels,2" the reality is more complex.
Both Visa and Mastercard were created as networks owned and operated by the member banks.24 7 Both associations had boards of directors
heavily weighted toward the largest banks issuing that particular credit
card, which were often the same set of banks.248 Each association had bylaws that permitted banks to issue both Visa and Mastercard cards, but prohibited banks from issuing any other credit cards, such as Discover or
American Express.24 9 The Antitrust Division challenged this governance
structure as a civil rule-of-reason violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
and sought injunctive relief.2 .o The Second Circuit ultimately held Visa and
Mastercard's practices unlawful under the rule of reason.25 '
In addition to complying with the terms of the judgment in the government case, Mastercard also fundamentally altered its ownership and governance structure through a subsequent initial public offering ("IPO") of
stock.252 At least part of the strategy behind the Mastercard IPO was an attempt to further reduce antitrust exposure by changing the fundamental
nature of the entity from a cooperative enterprise run by competitors into a
single economic actor owned by its shareholders, with the former member
banks having no day-to-day control over network policies and operations.253
The IPO established a relatively unusual governance structure, which
gave member banks more economic exposure than voting rights, "flipping
the usual dual-class voting structure upside-down."2" Despite these helpful
changes, numerous other policies and pricing decisions of the Visa and
Mastercard networks have also been the subject of continued private antitrust challenge.255
246
247
248
249

See, e.g., id at l l-13.
Id. atI1.
See id.
atI1-13.
See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2003); CONSTANTINE,
supra note 245, at 11-13.
250

See CONSTANTINE, supra note 245, at 91.

251 Visa, 344 F.3d at 238, 243-44.
252 Victor Fleischer, The MasterCardIPO: Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 137, 14445 (2007).
253 Id. at 150; Joshua D. Wright, MasterCard'sSingle Entity Strategy, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
225, 231-32 (2007).
254 Fleischer, supra note 252, at 138. The IPO also established a charitable foundation that holds a
significant block of Mastercard stock, which Professor Fleischer contends both provides takeover protection and also gives the member banks continuing influence without antitrust exposure. Id.
255 In addition to the government case discussed above, Visa and Mastercard have been subject to
substantial private treble damage antitrust litigation relating to the interchange fees they charge merchants, requirements that merchants accept both credit and debit cards, and separate policies that required merchants not to impose their own fees for processing credit or debit transactions or providing
discounts for cash purchases. The largest of these private cases settled for approximately $3 billion. See
CONSTANTINE, supra note 245, at 220. For an overview of these antitrust issues, see Adam J. Levitin,
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The importance of corporate governance and antitrust was also illustrated in a far less well-known case. 256 The company now known as Verisk
was formed originally as Insurance Service Office, Inc. ("ISO"), a captive
entity of the insurance industry and mutually owned by the leading competing firms in the industry. 25 7 ISO drafted standardized language for commercial general-liability insurance contracts and performed statistical and other
data analyses to aid its owners, the insurers, in underwriting insurance policies.258 As a matter of corporate governance, a board of directors comprised
of eighteen insurance executives and three noninsurers managed the ISO."'
The antitrust concerns arose out of the insurance crisis of the 1980s,
when insurance premiums skyrocketed and state and local governments
found it impossible to obtain certain types of insurance that had been previously available. 2 0 Insurance companies and other parts of the industry
insisted on more restrictive terms limiting existing coverage in different
ways.26 ' Prior policy terms were no longer made available.262
A coalition of state attorneys general and private parties sued U.S. and
foreign primary insurers, reinsurers, retrocessional insurance companies,
and ISO for entering into a group boycott and other unlawful agreements
under the Sherman Act.263 This litigation ultimately went to the Supreme
Court, which led to the establishment of important law as to the scope of
the antitrust exemption for both the insurance industry and the international
applications of the Sherman Act.2 6
As a result of the antitrust litigation, ISO entered into a consent decree
with state attorneys and certain private plaintiffs in 1995 and was demutualized, creating a new ownership and governance structure that was indepen-

Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 425, 459-62 (2007); Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America's Payment Systems, NoSurcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY. Bus. L.J. 265, 327-31 (2005); Steven

Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 941, 976-82 (2007); Steven Semeraro, The Antitrust Economics (and Law) of Surcharging Credit
Card Transactions, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 343, 352-53 (2009).
256 See generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
257 See id. at 772; About ISO, ISO.COM, http://www.iso.com/About-ISO/Overview/About-ISO.htm
(last visited June 26, 2011). Questions of antitrust liability are complicated in this context by the existence of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which creates an exemption for the business of insurance (but not
boycotts) where regulated by state law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW 133 (2007).

258 HartfordFire, 509 U.S. at 772.
259 See id. at 774.
260 See id at 773-76; Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 Emory L.J. 1155, 1157-59 (1990).
261 Hartford Fire,509 U.S. at 770-72.
262 See id. at 775-76.
263
264

See id at 769-74.
See id. at 784.
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dent from the insurers.265 The new board would consist of eleven members
with seven noninsurers, three insurers, and one management director. 2 " The
new independent board would elect the future noninsurer directors and the
insurer directors would elect the future insurance directors.2 67 Furthermore,
the insurance industry was barred from group participation in the affairs of
ISO for a five-year period. 2 68
Later renamed Verisk, the company continued to do business with the
industry on a contractual basis for both drafting standard-form contracts and
undertaking data analysis and research. 26 9 Freed from the conflicting incentives and cumbersome governance structure, the company prospered, deepened its product offerings, entered new markets, made a number of acquisitions, and transformed itself into a far more profitable and dynamic entity.
By the end of 2008, the firm had annual revenues of $894 million, with
revenues for the first half of 2009 over $500 million, in comparison to $220
million at the time of the consent decree.270 Profits increased substantially
over the same period as well.27 ' This in turn led to a successful IPO in October 2009,272 showing by example that good competition policy and good
corporate governance can go hand-in-hand.
E.

Mergers and Acquisitions

In terms of the duties of the board, mergers fall somewhere closer to
the need for vigilance against cartel activity and the reality of a relatively
backseat role in terms of guarding against unlawful monopolization and
abuse of dominance. It is the traditional province of the board to carefully
review any significant acquisitions outside the ordinary course of business. 273 The board is also required to authorize any change in control of the

265 Settlement Agreement at 10-12, 15-16, Attachment I, In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 767
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1995), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-state/pdf/
settlements/us-district/9th-circuit/insurance.pdf.
266 Id.at 15-16, Attachment I.
267 Id.at Attachment I.
268 Id at10 12.
269 See Verisk Analytics, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 49-52 (Aug. 12,2008).
270 See Verisk Analytics, Inc., Amendment No. 7 to Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 25
(Sept. 29, 2009); Press Release, Verisk Analytics, Inc., Insurance Services Office Proposes Change to
For-Profit; Part of Managed Evolution to Better Meet Customer Needs (Sept. 25, 1996), available at
http://www.verisk.com/Press-Releases/1 996/INSJRANCE-SERVICES-OFFICE-PROPOSESCHANGE-TO-FOR-PROFIT-PART-OF-MANAGED-EVOLUTION-TO-BETTER-MEET-CU.html.
271 Verisk Analytics, Inc., Registration Statement, supra note 269, at 22-23.
272 See Verisk Analytics, Inc., Amendment No. 7, supra note 270, at F-7; Phil Wahba, UPDATE 2Verisk IPO Raises $1.88 bln, Prices Above Range, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2009/10/07/verisk-idUSNO533161120091007.
273 FANTO,supra note 20, § 5:3.1, at 5-5.
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corporation.274 In addition to questions of fairness and valuation of any acquisition, the board would normally be informed of any significant legal
risks, including antitrust issues, in the proposed merger or acquisition and
would take those considerations into account in making its overall determination to approve or reject the transaction.2 75
The antitrust remedy for an unlawful merger normally is the prospective blocking of the merger prior to closing or a restructuring to eliminate
the effect on competition.2 76 Under this scenario, the planning and organization of the transaction obviously entail costs to the corporation, as do the
premerger notification and investigation of the transaction. Even the abandonment of the merger in the face of an inevitable antitrust challenge or an
unsuccessful court challenge, however, does not involve imprisonment,
criminal or civil fines, or even treble damages under most normal circumstances. While treble damages are theoretically possible for any person who
has been injured in his business or property as a result of an antitrust violation, it is difficult to define who could be so injured by a merger that was
never consummated. The federal government, state attorneys general, and
private parties do, however, retain the right to challenge an unlawfully anticompetitive merger after consummation, despite the attendant disruptions
and costs of unscrambling the omelet.27 7 But again, such litigation is rare,
almost never successful by anyone other than the federal government, and
the possibility of damages is remote.
Antitrust analysis for mergers and acquisitions is complicated and contingent on questions of market definition and market power, often technical
theories of anticompetitive harm, the likelihood of market entry to offset
potential harm, likely efficiencies, and, occasionally, whether one or both of
the merger parties constitute "failing firms."2 78 This is normally beyond the
expertise of the board and often dependent on market facts outside the control of corporation or even its merger partner.
However, there is mounting evidence from the corporate finance
community that suggests entire categories of deals are fraught with peril
and more likely to destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder value.279 A
growing body of both empirical and theoretical literature has questioned the
premises and results of an unconstrained market for corporate control being
See Shail Pandit, Do Bad Boards Allow Bad Acquisitions? I (Feb. 10, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 340514.
275 Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1558-59 (D. Del. 1995)
(holding that the defendant board made reasonable investigations, including predictions about antitrust
concerns, before rejecting tender offer).
276 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a() (2006).
277 See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 278-85 (1990).
278 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, §§ 4-11.
279 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323, 328-29 (1986) (using the free cash flow theory to predict the outcomes
of mergers and takeovers).
274
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necessary or sufficient to solve the agency cost problems of corporate governance or create greater efficiency warranting deferential antitrust review
of these same mergers.280 Certain of this literature comes from the corporate
finance and accounting fields.28 ' Other relevant sources come from the
growing field of behavioral economics, as applied to antitrust and
finance.282 Together, these sources and studies strongly suggest that certain
categories of mergers destroy shareholder value and do little, if anything, to
create meaningful efficiencies or to enhance market competition.283 At a
minimum, corporate governance and antitrust policy should be harmonized
to strongly scrutinize and question transactions that work at cross-purposes
to both bodies of law.
The corporate finance literature has suggested that certain identifiable
categories of mergers typically destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder
value.2 8 Noted finance Professor Michael Jensen observed relatively early
on that value-destroying mergers are more likely when "managers of firms
[have] unused borrowing power and large free cash flows."285 This is yet
another illustration of the problem of agency costs and the tendency for
managers to invest in below-average or even value-destroying mergers,
rather than other investments and payouts that are more beneficial to shareholders.
Professor James Fanto has summarized numerous studies from the
corporate finance literature to conclude that megamergers of roughly equal
firms financed through stock-for-stock mechanisms are another type of
transaction that is particularly suspect for its potential to destroy shareholder value. "' While the ill-fated AOL-Time Warner merger is the poster child
for this type of transaction and unfortunate outcome,2 87 it is hardly alone.

280 See, e.g., James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 249, 333-51 (2001) (proposing an enhanced standard to govern
directors in a mega-merger); Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of
Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 758-60 (2005).
281 See, e.g., Dinara Bayazitova et al., Which Mergers Destroy Value? Only Mega-Mergers 30
(Mar. 6, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1502385.
282 See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 261, 285, 29596 (2010); Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1553-70
(2011); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Behavioral Economics: Observations Regarding Issues That Lie Ahead, Remarks at the Vienna Competition Conference 12-14 (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/1 00609viennaremarks.pdf
283 See Jensen, supra note 279, at 328.
284 See id. at 328-29.
285 Id. at 328.
286 James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger
Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1347-57 (2001).

287 See Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time Warner Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11,
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/1 /business/media/l lmerger.html; Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Ex-Time Warner Chief Apologises for 'the Worst Deal of the Century', FIN. TIMES
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Professor Fanto has identified numerous mergers such as Travelers-Citicorp
and US West-Qwest as further examples of this trend.288 Professor Fanto
also notes that mergers dependent on poorly articulated synergies are also
particularly suspect for their value-destroying tendencies.29
More recent studies have confirmed these dismal conclusions.2 " A
2005 study by Professors Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann, and
Rend M. Stulz found that "from 1991 to 2001 (the 1990s), acquiring firms'
shareholders lost an aggregate $216 billion, or more than 50 times the $4
billion they lost from 1980 to 1990 (the 1980s), yet firms spent just 6 times
as much on acquisitions in the later period."29 ' Most of the studies suggesting that mergers in general may create value focus on short-term changes in
stock valuations of the acquired and acquiring companies following the
public announcement of the transaction.2 92 These studies' results are not
surprising, since the acquired corporation's stock is likely to increase in
value, given that the acquisition price is frequently a premium of the current
stock price. This increase is often greater than any decrease of the acquiring
company's stock price, a phenomenon that has led certain finance scholars
to conclude that mergers (properly controlled for other variables) are both
efficiency enhancing and value enhancing.293
Longer term studies of the actual performance of the deal over time
reach very different conclusions.2 " At a minimum, there is no significant
support for the claim of broad efficiencies in the overall market for mergers.295 Too many mergers and acquisitions end badly to take comfort in an
unregulated market for corporate control as the answer to either the agency
cost problem in corporate governance or the pursuit of an efficient competitive market for antitrust purpose. Nor do these studies cast any doubt on the
more particularized claims of Professor Fanto and others that stock-for(Jan. 5, 2010), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/719fb8c2-f999-1Ide-8085-00144feab49a.html
#axzzlNOSTd52q.
288 Fanto, supranote 280, at 265-66; Fanto, supranote 286, at 1359 & n.81.
289 See Fanto, supra note 280, at 279.
290 See, e.g., Bayazitova et al., supra note 281, at 17.
291 Moeller et al., supra note 280, at 758. The study further notes that "acquiring-firm shareholders
gained $24 billion from 1991 through 1997 before losing $240 billion from 1998 to 2001." Id. at 75859. The authors conclude that "[t]he large losses from 1998 through 2001 cannot be explained by a
wealth transfer from acquiring-firm shareholders to acquired-firm shareholders." Id. at 759.
292 See, e.g., Moeller et al., supra note 280, at 761-63; Bayazitova et al., supranote 281, at 30.
293 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP.
21, 22-23 (1988).
294 See generally Anup Agrawal et al., The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A ReExamination ofan Anomaly, 47 J. FIN. 1605 (1992).
295 See DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F. M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY 193 (1987); Dennis C. Mueller, The Finance Literature on Mergers: A Critical Survey, in
COMPETITION, MONOPOLY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KEITH COWLING

161, 177-78 (Michael Waterson ed., 2003); F. M. Scherer, A New Retrospective on Mergers, 28 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 327, 341 (2006).
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stock megamergers of equals remain the category of corporate transactions
most likely to produce massive wealth destruction for shareholders.
Studies by the Federal Reserve Bank and other business scholars have
suggested that there may be slightly different results for financial and banking mergers versus those in the industrial sector.2 9 An analysis by Federal
Reserve Bank staff of over 250 prior studies suggests that mergers in the
finance and banking sector increased market power, produced no meaningful cost efficiencies, produced some efficiency in payment systems, and
increased some systematic risk.297 Even in the banking sector, however,
sound governance mechanisms can be helpful in preventing bank executives from pursuing value-destroying acquisitions.298
Corporate governance principles, as well as behavioral economics, go
a long way to explaining why corporations would consistently engage in
behavior that is so harmful to shareholder interest. The central insight, originating with Berle and Means, is that the incentives of officers and directors are not well-aligned with those of shareholders. 2 9 Many scholars have
focused on the incentives and rewards for corporate decisionmakers (the
officers and particularly the CEO) to explain suboptimal decisions and the
continued biases toward mergers even when they are not value enhancing."* Studies from the 1980s through the present show a tendency of management to pursue acquisitions opposed to the interests of shareholders in
order to enhance their employment security, to build empires, or simply to
expand the perquisites of office.30
A variant of this explanation focuses on CEO autonomy, hubris, overconfidence, and narcissism as key explanations of the pursuit of mergers
that will, predictably, end poorly.302 Similarly, weak corporate governance,
296 See Allen N. Berger et al., The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 135, 145 (1999); Jason Karceski et
al., The Impact ofBank Consolidation on Commercial Borrower Welfare, 60 J. FIN. 2043, 2044 (2005).
297 See generally Berger et al., supra note 296.
298 Jens Hagendorff et al., Bank Governance and Acquisition Performance, 15 CORP.

GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. 957, 961 (2007).
299 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 119-25; see also WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 87 (3d ed. 2009) ("The major problems in corporation law deal with the relations between 'outside' investors, who lack power, and 'insiders,' who
control the company's assets . . . .").
3
Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A
Bonuses, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 142 (2004).
301 Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate
Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 606-09 (1981); Randall Morck et al., Do Managerial Objectives Drive
Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31, 31-34 (1990); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate
Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 199-200 (1986); Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from "Mergers ofEquals ", 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 60,63-65 (2004).
3
Fanto, supra note 280, at 257; Mathew L. A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the
Premium Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCL Q. 103, 105-06 (1997);
Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions?CEO Overconfidence and the Market's

HeinOnline -- 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 876 2010-2011

2011]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

877

lack of information, and the continued misaligned interests of directors beholden to corporate insiders suggest that a board of directors will not typically be in a position to stop these suboptimal acquisition plans once embarked upon by a powerful CEO.303 Behavioral economics also provides
additional insight into why even well-meaning CEOs, as the key players in
this process, may behave in such a fashion.
Behavioral economics documents, through empirical research, how actual human beings behave "quasi-rationally," rather than as the purely rational, profit-maximizing entities assumed in most traditional law-andeconomics analyses."* Instead of the purely rational profit-maximizing individual or organization as posited by the rational-choice theorists, behavioral economics seeks to show that decisionmakers tend to act with
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.30
Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 21 (2008); Scherer, supra note 295, at 337 ("[W]e in the US have created
a sizeable professional establishment that sees as a significant justification for its existence the making
of mergers."); Nihat Aktas et al., CEO Narcissism and the Takeover Process: From Private Initiation to
Deal
Completion
4-5
(Nov.
19,
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1638972; Bayazitova et al., supra note 281, at 30.
For a description and critique of the trends toward CEO primacy, autonomy, and hubris, see generally
Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54 ST. LOUiS
U. L.J. 1 (2009); Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory
Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 334 (2007); Steven A. Ramirez, The Special
Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of Corporate Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 345
(2007).
303 Pandit, supra note 274, at 8-12.
304 See, e.g., S. Mullainathan & R. H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics, in 20 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1094, 1094 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B.

Baltes eds., 2001); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 18 (Daniel Kahneman et al.

eds., 1982); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1476-78 (1998); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1343-44 (1990); Daniel Kahneman, Maps ofBoundedRationality: Psychologyfor Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1469 (2003); Russell B. Korobkin
& Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1055-56 (2000); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing
of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, SCI., Jan. 30, 1981, at 453, 453. For applications of behavioral economics to legal and regulatory policies aimed at a general audience, see generally RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (Penguin Books 2009) (2008); RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES
AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMic LIFE (1992). For examples of behavioral economics as applied to antitrust, see generally Leslie, supra note 175; Reeves & Stucke, supra note 282; Maurice E. Stucke, Beha-

vioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007);
Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101
MICH. L. REV. 482 (2002); Rosch, supra note 282. Not all commentators view behavioral economics as
a viable addition to antitrust analysis. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden et al., Behavioral Antitrust and
Merger Control (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-14, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1612282.
305 Stucke, supra note 304, at 527.
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This behavioral research documents how both consumers and business
decisionmakers are prone to predictable biases and use known heuristics
and other shortcuts that produce suboptimal decisions in the real world. "
Some of the well-known biases and heuristics relevant to the decision to
enter into mergers and acquisitions that frequently result in valuedestroying transactions include: myopia, loss aversion, endowment effects,
status quo bias, extremeness aversion, overoptimism, hindsight bias, anchoring heuristics, availability heuristics, framing effects, representative
bias, and saliency effects." One does not have to stretch to find numerous
acquisitions driven by corporate decisionmakers suffering from overoptimism combined with numerous other all-too-human tendencies to produce poorly conceived or overpriced acquisitions dependent on future synergies and efficiencies that were unachievable in the real world. Professor
Richard Thaler has described these types of outcomes more generally as the
winner's curse.30 s
Professor Fanto surveyed the securities filings for the ten largest mergers and acquisitions for 1998, 1999, and 2000 and concluded that most of
these biases are present in the statements that managers and board members
relied upon, were legally bound by, and/or used to persuade shareholders to
approve the very largest transactions of those years.3" Most of these transactions were among the most significant value-destroying deals of their

eras. 3 10
The Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2005 study notes that most of
the largest value-destroying acquisitions constituted the last in a series of
acquisitions by the acquiring firm.31 This further suggests that the behavioral-economics factors identified by Fanto and others, such as overconfidence, hindsight bias, and framing effects, have played an important role in
the destruction of shareholder wealth.
These common human tendencies, combined with broad CEO autonomy and hubris, produce incentives to pursue certain mergers and acquisitions that benefit no one other than senior management. At the same time, a
passive board of directors, generally lacking in information and resources to
challenge senior management, creates incentives to approve transactions
that benefit few other than senior management.
Behavioral economics also provides additional insights into the critical
issue of entry in the market where the merger has occurred. Once the gov306 See, e.g., Reeves & Stucke, supranote 282, at 1532-43.
307 See Fanto,supra note 286, at 1342-46; Stucke, supra note 304, at 527-28.
308 THALER, supra note 304; see also Roll, supra note 301, at 200 (stating that acquiring corporations often fail to account for the "winner's curse" when making takeover bids).
3
See generally Fanto,supra note 286.
310 Id. at 1374-80; see also Steven Lipin & Nikhil Deogun, Deals & Dealmakers: Big Mergers of
'90s Prove Disappointingto Shareholders,WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at Cl .
311 Moeller et al., supra note 280, at 781.
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ernment (or other plaintiff) has established that the merger is likely to produce anticompetitive effects,3 12 they have established a prima facie case that
the transaction has violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The defendants
may then rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case by showing that the merger
nonetheless is unlikely to substantially harm competition."'
The most typical type of evidence shows that entry barriers to the affected market are so low that any postmerger price increase would be ineffective as a result of inducing timely, effective entry that would be profitable at even premerger prices.314 Professor Avishalom Tor has discussed how
the insights of behavioral economics demonstrate that postmerger entry
may be more prevalent than normally assumed, but it usually is less effective in disciplining the postmerger exercise of market power than normally
believed."' Conversely, Professor Maurice Stucke provides numerous examples where even admittedly moderate entry barriers are insufficient to
prevent the exercise of market power."
A robust market for corporate control goes hand-in-hand with a vigorous continued antitrust presence in securities market. If anything, the role
for antitrust in takeover markets has been minimized in recent years to the
detriment of both corporate governance and competition policy. Accepting
the need for a robust market for corporate control suggests that a continued
antitrust presence, which has been minimized in recent times, is also
needed. If shareholders are going to receive maximum value, rules that forbid collusive bidding for firms and limit the termination of auctions for
firms once in play are required.' Accepting that a robust market for corporate control is needed also suggests limiting the growth of antitrust immunities in the securities law field. It also suggests limiting ill-advised and overly deferential reliance by the courts on securities regulators to maintain

312 United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963); Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1071-72 (D.D.C. 1997).
313 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506-07 (1974); 2010 HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, §§ 9-11, at 27-32.
314 See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States
v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 978-79 (2d Cir. 1984); 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 49, § 9, at 27-29. Proof by the defendants of substantial merger-specific efficiencies that
offset any anticompetitive harm will also rebut a prima facie violation of Section 7. Fed. Trade Comm'n
v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 49, § 10, at 29-31.
315 Tor, supra note 304, at 488-92. Brand management and marketing literature firther suggests
that the repositioning of existing brands offered as an alternative to entry may be virtually impossible in
the real world. See generally Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law,
2010 BYU L. REV. 1425, 1480 (2011).
316 Stucke, supra note 304, at 563-72.
317 See Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1365,
1381 (1989) (explaining how bargaining between bidders is susceptible to collusion).
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competition in order to maximize shareholder value in the takeover
process. 18
If management cannot document convincingly why a particular newly
contemplated transaction of the type that typically has harmed shareholders
in the past is different than similar previous transactions, then the board
should have the duty to reject the deal as against the interests of shareholders. If it fails to do so, the board should be held liable, not because the
transaction turned out badly, but because the board ignored the red flags of
the past and failed in its duty to adequately probe the new transaction in
advance.319 Similarly, if the principal reason that a transaction may enhance
shareholder value is the likely increased exercise of market power, rather
than dubious efficiency scenarios that typically have not panned out in the
past, then the board must similarly do more before the transaction meets
with their approval.
Broader changes could do much to better align corporate boards' incentives to enter into mergers and acquisitions that both increase shareholder value and do not violate the antitrust laws. Such changes could also cause
boards to refrain from proceeding with transactions that violate either or
both legal regimes. Some commentators have proposed addressing this issue by amending the Clayton Act itself to shift the burden of proof and persuasion to the parties to a transaction, requiring them to demonstrate the
procompetitive and efficiency-enhancing aspects of the deal in order to wmi
approval.320 While this would certainly do the trick, such a wide-ranging
proposal raises serious issues beyond the unlikely chances of its adoption
by Congress. The most noticeable is that it uses antitrust law as a club to
indirectly achieve governance goals, but the real problem is that the deal is
value destroying for shareholders, not that it harms competition for the public.
More nuanced proposals regarding corporate governance have included increased disclosure of efficiency claims to the SEC and shareholders when such claims are the basis for proceeding with the kind of stockfor-stock megadeals that have proved so destructive of shareholder value in
the past.321 To avoid pro forma disclosure that does nothing to avoid or to
deter such transactions, post-transaction reporting should be required to

318 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 270-71, 285 (2007); Elec. Trading
Grp., LLC v. Banc ofAm. Sec. LLC, 588 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2009).
319 Liability for failing to inform others of red flags has been found in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Grant Thornton, LLP v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 694 F. Supp. 2d 506, 521-22 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (holding that counsel had a duty to inform its client bank's board of directors of red flags associated with a
board decision).
320 See AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE'S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES 155, 169 (Albert A. Foer ed., 2008).
321 E.g., Stucke, supranote 304, at 582.
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document where efficiencies and synergies have been realized and where
such benefits have failed to materialize.322
The increased scrutiny for dubious, value-destroying deals should be
applied to both antitrust and corporate governance. Antitrust agencies and
courts should exercise increased skepticism of such transactions. This scrutiny should be in addition to increased duties for corporate boards and disclosure to the securities agencies. Antitrust and securities agencies should
work hand-in-hand so that parties to mergers and acquisitions are providing
consistent, truthful, and credible information to both sets of agencies just as
the antitrust agencies currently do with their U.S. sectoral regulators and
their foreign counterparts. If efficiency claims are weak, then parties have a
more serious burden under corporate governance law to explain why the
transaction enhances shareholder value. And if the efficiency claims are
weak, but the parties are claiming that the transaction nonetheless enhances
shareholder value, then they have some antitrust explaining to do. Parties
cannot have it both ways, or do even worse by proceeding with transactions
that fly in the face of the values promoted by both fields of law and potentially harm both shareholders and consumers in the process.
F.

Abuse ofDominance

Liability for abuse of dominance and for monopolization is much more
nuanced, almost never condemned without a highly intensive inquiry into
facts and economic effects, and less subject to international consensus as to
theories of liability and remedies.323 Such cases tend to be few and far between, but they have much higher stakes, as illustrated by the Microsoft
litigation in the United States,324 in the European Union,325 and elsewhere
around the world.3 26 In almost every jurisdiction, such investigations and
cases begin with an examination of whether the firm in question has market
power, which is frequently dependent on difficult questions of market defi322 Robert Pitofsky, Proposalsfor Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEo. L.J. 195, 222-27 (1992) (proposing conditional clearance of mergers subject to post-closing
verification of efficiencies).
323 See, e.g., Rudolph Peritz, Re-Thinking U.S. v. Microsoft in Light ofthe E.C. Case 4 (N.Y. Law
Sch.
Pub.
Law &
Legal
Theory,
Paper
No.
04/05-4,
2004),
available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=571803 (stating that the monopolization claim in
Microsofi required a "fact-intensive inquiry" over a finding of "per se illegality" notwithstanding "clear
anti-competitive implications").
324 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,48 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
325 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601,146 (imposing a fine of over
E497 million).
326 Cf Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Managing Antitrust Compliance Through the Continuing Surge in
Global Enforcement, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 965, 983 & n.51 (2009) (describing proceedings against Microsoft throughout the world).
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nition. 32 If regulators find significant market power, then the case typically
turns on an analysis of very specific corporate behavior involving pricing,
contracting practices, innovation programs, product design, and other questions of corporate strategy.3 28 Standards for unlawful monopolization or
abuse of a dominant position differ greatly between jurisdictions.329
In the United States, liability increasingly turns on whether the anticompetitive harm outweighs the procompetitive benefits and efficiencies
generated by the very same conduct at issue. In modern times, penalties
generally are behavioral, rather than structural.330 Criminal enforcement is
theoretically possible, but has not been used since the late 1960s and appears to have been abandoned as a realistic option."'
There are very few cases that define what should constitute the appropriate red flags in connection with potential liability for monopolization or
abuse of dominance. One of the few recent examples arose not surprisingly
for Intel Corporation, which recently faced a series of competition law investigations and cases throughout the world.332
A shareholder derivative action in the United States alleged that the
board's failure to prevent Intel from unlawfully monopolizing the market
for computer microprocessors resulted in a breach of the board's fiduciary
duty.3 33 The board of directors ultimately succeeded because the plaintiffs
failed to plead particular facts demonstrating that the board had actual or
constructive knowledge of the wrongdoing such that a failure to respond to
the alleged red flags resulted in a breach of their fiduciary duties to properly
monitor corporate compliance."

327 ICN Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Dominance/SubstantialMarket Power Analysis Pursuiant to Unilateral Conduct Laws: Recommended Practices 1-4 (2011), available at
http://intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc317.pdf (listing and describing criteria for
determining whether a firm has market power).
328 See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154-59 (3d Cir. 2003) (examining corporate
practices, including above-cost pricing, rebates, and exclusive dealing contracts after determining that
the accused firm had significant market power).
329 Michal S. Gal et al., Introduction: Expansion and Contraction in Monopolization Law, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 653, 656 (2010).
330 Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. I1, 18 (2009).
331 The last known criminal case under Section 2 appears to be from 1967. See Raymond P. Niro &
J. William Wigert, Jr., Patents, Fraud and the Antitrust Laws, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168, 176-79
(1968) (describing the DOJ's criminal proceedings against the Union Camp Corporation, its president
and patent counsel, and the Bemis Bag Company under Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act).
332 See Complaint at 17, In re Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.fitc.gov/osladjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf, Case COMP/C-3/37.990, In re Intel, 43-44
(May 13, 2009) (imposing a fine of over one billion Euros for Intel's abuse of its dominant position in
the European Union).
In re Intel Corp. Derivative Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 165, 169 (D. Del. 2009).
3
Id. at 174.
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The court in In re Intel Corp. Derivative Litigation33 noted that the
plaintiffs did "little more than .

.

. catalog the ongoing investigations into

Intel's alleged wrongdoing" as an attempt to show that, by virtue of the
existence of numerous red flags, the directors faced "substantial likelihood"
of personal liability."' In other instances, the court found that some of the
more specific allegations of red flags at the time of the decision were premature, and thus not grounds for liability.337 This included an investigation
by the European Commission that the court characterized as preliminary."
In contrast, the court noted that the Japan Fair Trade Commission's
("JFTC") investigation and report on the anticompetitive activities of an
Intel subsidiary in Japan could constitute a red flag.339 However, the fact
that the board complied with the JFTC report showed that it had, in fact,
responded to the red flag.3" In addition, the plaintiff pointed to investigations by the Korean Fair Trade Commission and the New York Attorney
General as constituting sufficient red flags."' However, the court held that
the plaintiffs had failed to adequately demonstrate that the individual directors either knew or should have known about the illegal anticompetitive
activities.32
Intel thus suggests that there is no reason to think that a board can micromanage each decision of firms with market power, although the need for
monitoring systems seems appropriate once market power is achieved or
becomes a serious risk. However, there are also areas of legitimate concern
for dominant firms (like any other corporate entity) where board involvement is more traditional. These can include acquisition of fringe and potential rivals, patterns of deception, and broadly exclusionary conduct at the
strategic (rather than operational) level. In short, these are some areas
where the business judgment rule does, and ought to, have some bite in

335 621 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D. Del. 2009).
336 Id at 175 (second internal quotation marks omitted).
337 Id. at 175-76.
338 Id at 175.
339 Id at 176.
340 Id.
341 In re Intel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76.
342 Id. at 174. Since the court's decision, the EU has fined Intel in excess of one billion Euros,
Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Imposes Fine of 61.06 bn on Intel for Abuse
of Dominant Position; Orders Intel to Cease Illegal Practices (May 13, 2009), available at
and the FTC has brought and
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference-P/09/745,
settled a case against Intel for violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1) (2006), which prohibits "unfair methods of competition." Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
FTC Challenges Intel's Dominance of Worldwide Microprocessor Markets (Dec. 16, 2009), availableat
http://www.fic.gov/opa/2009/12/intel.shtm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Settles Charges of
Anticompetitive
Conduct
Against
Intel
(Aug.
4,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/intel.shtm.
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For example, the
terms of director involvement and ultimate liability."
United Kingdom's statute and guidelines on director disqualification for
competition violations state that the competition authority will take into
account any genuine uncertainty over the legality of the conduct.' Commentators expressed the particular hope that this would be the case for
abuse-of-dominance cases, where "the boundaries between competing 'on
the merits' and illegal conduct can be particularly opaque."M
CONCLUSION

Better understanding the ties between corporate governance and competition law should lead to important legal and policy changes. Looking at
the fields for their intersections, rather than their differences, opens up potential avenues for change on both sides of the existing fence.
For directors, clear rules are better than complicated, highly factspecific inquiries where after-the-fact second guessing may expose the directors to potential liability. This is the basis for the business judgment rule
in the first place. While a director obviously prefers no liability to the possibility of some liability, at the same time a clear "no" is often better than a
"maybe" when viewed ex ante rather than ex post. While the existing statutory rules barring interlocking directorates between competing corporations
are by no means perfect, they are workable and clear rules that most businesses have little difficulty complying with, even though the statutory provision undoubtedly produces both false positives and false negatives from
time to time.
Sometimes highly fact-specific inquiries may be unavoidable. Some
clear-cut rules about when a board of directors must take action to prevent
or to report cartel activity do exist." However, they are few and far between and are mostly limited to situations where it is already too late from
the point of view of either good governance or good competition policy.
Better incentives can be created for both good governance and effective
compliance policies through individual director liability when reasonable
steps are not taken to implement and monitor compliance programs that
have a reasonable likelihood of deterring, detecting, and reporting hard-core
activity. As the business judgment rule teaches, courts should defer to rea343 In the modem era, it is hard to envision the active participation of the board of directors in the
monopolization of an industry as appeared to be the case throughout the gilded era of the late 19th
century. See generally RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. (1998) (detailing Rockefeller's monopolization of the oil refining and transportation industries).
3
OFT GUIDELINES, supra note 225, § 4.26, at 13.
345 John Ratliff et al., Let the Punishment Fit the Crime? UK's OFT Publishes Revised Guidance
on Disqualifying Directors for Competition Law Infringements, WILMERHALE (July 15, 2010),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=9563.
346 See supra Part IV.C.
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sonable judgments, but a board's failure to exercise judgment is not worthy
of deference, and director liability may be appropriate when the failure to
act has harmed the corporation and its shareholders. Suboptimal governance
and decisionmaking can be further discouraged through statutory, judicial,
or regulatory director disqualification where board members have been
actively complicit or have manifestly fallen down on the job. Even in the
fuzzier area of rule of reason liability, good governance structures can be
designed to minimize both conflicting incentives and anticompetitive consequences.
In the merger area, the corporate finance literature is convincing that
megamergers on a stock-for-stock basis between roughly equal competitors
are highly likely to destroy shareholder value." There are a number of resulting helpful steps in both corporate governance law as well as antitrust
that can be taken. On the corporate governance side, the tendency of stockfor-stock megamergers among equals to be value destroying argues in favor
of enhanced board duties in reviewing and approving such deals. This
trend further suggests the need for enhanced securities disclosure to shareholders and regulators for these categories of value-destroying deals and for
situations where parties to the transaction seek to rely on efficiency
claims.34 Both securities and competition regulators must be more vigilant
in scrutinizing such facile claims, which rarely materialize in the real world.
Finally, the courts should apply an intermediate standard of review in place
of the current formulation of the business judgment rule, which amounts to
near-blind deference to board approval.350
On the antitrust side, increased attention is needed as to what types of
deals prove to be value destroying and why they do not succeed. Additionally, there needs to be a better understanding of why predicted synergies
and efficiencies often are not achieved. More importantly, the field needs a
better understanding of why certain deals may be value enhancing. If there
are not substantial synergies and efficiency gains, when is increased market
power a more likely explanation?
To be clear, mergers are not unlawful under the antitrust laws because
they are stupid or they mean well but turn out badly. Mergers only violate
Section 7 of the Clayton Act when they have the tendency to substantially
harm competition."' The present situation, however, is the worst of all
possible worlds, because certain types of mergers do nothing for shareholders or for competition. Even worse, both bodies of law, which purport to
regulate such transactions, have inadequate tools to help shareholders or
competition in the market as a whole.
347

See supra Part I.E.

348 Fanto, supra note 280, at 251-58.
349 Reeves & Stucke, supra note 282, at 1575; Stucke, supra note 304, at 582.
350 See Fanto, supra note 280, at 263.
351 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
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Although it is not phrased this way, there is at least a soft presumption
in both corporate governance and antitrust that most mergers and acquisitions are efficient and should be regulated primarily by market forces. The
Horizontal Merger Guidelines come closest to this in stating that the "primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies.""' The growing empirical and theoretical evidence from
the economic, finance, and accounting worlds as well as behavioral economics suggest this is not inevitably so.353
The key question, ex ante, is: which types of mergers are likely to generate which types of efficiencies with what degree of probability and what
degree of magnitude? To the extent that the economic, financial, and corporate governance literature is persuasive that there are categories of mergers
that are sufficiently value destroying and that the ex ante efficiency claims
are strongly suspect, then the agencies and the courts should be particularly
suspicious of such claims. As a result, any legal presumptions should run
against such claims.
These collective blind spots cannot be remedied without both communities investing in increased attention to each other's literature, language, and expertise. For the antitrust community, this means greater investment in business theory as a supplement to the already substantial economic expertise brought to bear on merger analysis. For the corporate governance community, this means increased attention to the role of competitive and anticompetitive outcomes in formulating duties and responsibilities
for corporate actors. Combining the two fields suggests new possibilities of
collaborative research and teaching across formerly separate law school
subjects and between law school and business school faculty.
Antitrust lawyers and policymakers can also play a meaningful role in
corporate governance as competition advocates. It is common practice for
competition agencies, bar associations, antitrust committees, specialty antitrust associations, practitioners, and academics to play an active role in
competition advocacy more generally.354 Potential improvements include
formulation of antitrust guidelines by federal, state, and foreign agencies,
and/or formulation of policies and rules by sectoral regulators at the federal,
state, and local levels. Such competition advocacy must be extended to related issues in corporate governance when government and private groups
are formulating policies that seek to ameliorate (or worsen) the conflicting
incentives and agency costs that lie at the heart of corporate governance.
352 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 10, at 29-31.
353 F. M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
5, 16-18 (2001).
See generally James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the
FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005); D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 135-64 (2009); Maurice E. Stucke,
Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 951 (2008).
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Only in such a world of deep interaction and continued interdisciplinary
learning will both shareholders and consumers benefit from efficient and
shareholder-oriented public corporations operating in a more consumerfriendly and competitive economy.
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